{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,25]],"date-time":"2025-10-25T14:19:45Z","timestamp":1761401985308,"version":"3.37.3"},"reference-count":33,"publisher":"Oxford University Press (OUP)","issue":"10","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2019,6,13]],"date-time":"2019-06-13T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1560384000000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/academic.oup.com\/journals\/pages\/open_access\/funder_policies\/chorus\/standard_publication_model"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001809","name":"National Natural Science Foundation of China","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["61772341","61472254"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["61772341","61472254"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001809","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"name":"STSCM","award":["18511103002"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["18511103002"]}]},{"name":"Changjiang Young Scholars in University of China"},{"name":"China Top Young Talents"},{"name":"Shanghai Top Young Talents"},{"name":"Shanghai Engineering Research Center of Digital Education Equipmen"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2019,9,1]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n               <jats:p>The advent of big data era has given rise to the big data trading market because of the potentially enormous economic value. However, designing an effective trading mechanism for the data trading market is still in its infancy. Existing several incentive mechanisms have neglected the important fact that data consumers have both preferences and complex conflicts of interest (CoI) relations among them. In response to the limitations of existing trading mechanisms, we propose DTPCI, a truthful double auction mechanism for a Data Trading market with two unique characteristics of consumers\u2019 Preferences and complex CoI relations among them. However, three major challenges have to be addressed, i.e. diverse market preferences, the complex CoI relations of data consumers and the strategic behaviors of both two sides. To jointly address the three challenges, we propose DTPCI to achieve nonnegative social welfare, which features a group rule and a data trading rule. The group rule generates all conflict-free virtual groups based on the CoI graph. The data trading rule adopts the group buying to share data and expense. Through rigorous theoretical analysis and real-data based experiments, we demonstrate that DTPCI achieves all the desired economic properties.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1093\/comjnl\/bxz025","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2019,4,4]],"date-time":"2019-04-04T11:03:43Z","timestamp":1554375823000},"page":"1490-1504","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":10,"title":["Double Auction for a Data Trading Market with Preferences and Conflicts of Interest"],"prefix":"10.1093","volume":"62","author":[{"given":"Hui","family":"Cai","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University"}]},{"given":"Yanmin","family":"Zhu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University"},{"name":"Shanghai Key Lab of Scalable Computing and Systems, Shanghai Jiao Tong University"}]},{"given":"Jie","family":"Li","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University"}]},{"given":"Jiadi","family":"Yu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University"}]}],"member":"286","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2019,6,13]]},"reference":[{"year":"2011","key":"2019102108591177300_bxz025C1"},{"key":"2019102108591177300_bxz025C2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"51","DOI":"10.1089\/big.2013.1508","article-title":"Data science and its relationship to big data and data-driven decision making","volume":"1","author":"Provost","year":"2013","journal-title":"Big Data"},{"key":"2019102108591177300_bxz025C3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1007\/s10708-013-9516-8","article-title":"The real-time city? big data and smart urbanism","volume":"79","author":"Kitchin","year":"2014","journal-title":"GeoJournal"},{"year":"2014","key":"2019102108591177300_bxz025C4"},{"year":"2011","key":"2019102108591177300_bxz025C5"},{"year":"2000","key":"2019102108591177300_bxz025C6"},{"year":"2000","key":"2019102108591177300_bxz025C7"},{"key":"2019102108591177300_bxz025C8","first-page":"1482","article-title":"Data markets in the cloud: an opportunity for the database community","volume":"4","author":"Balazinska","year":"2011","journal-title":"PVLDB"},{"key":"2019102108591177300_bxz025C9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"268","DOI":"10.1109\/TSIPN.2017.2668144","article-title":"Data trading with multiple owners, collectors, and users: an iterative auction mechanism","volume":"3","author":"Cao","year":"2017","journal-title":"IEEE Trans. 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