{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,6,16]],"date-time":"2026-06-16T08:01:24Z","timestamp":1781596884726,"version":"3.54.5"},"reference-count":33,"publisher":"Oxford University Press (OUP)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2019,6,26]],"date-time":"2019-06-26T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1561507200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":1,"URL":"http:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-nc\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001691","name":"Japan Society for the Promotion of Science","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["JP19K13606"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["JP19K13606"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001691","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100003725","name":"National Research Foundation of Korea","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100003725","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"name":"Korean Government","award":["NRF-2017S1A3A2067220"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["NRF-2017S1A3A2067220"]}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,2,1]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title><jats:p>Dense cooperative networks are an essential element of social capital for prosperous societies. These networks enable individuals to overcome collective action dilemmas by enhancing trust. In many biological and social settings, network structures evolve endogenously as agents exit relationships and build new ones. However, the interplay between game strategy and interaction structure by which evolutionary dynamics leads to self-organization of dense cooperative networks has not been understood. Our prisoner\u2019s dilemma experiments with exit and partner choice options show that core\u2013periphery segregation of cooperators and defectors drives the emergence of cooperation. Cooperators\u2019 Quit-for-Tat and defectors\u2019 Roving strategy lead to a highly asymmetric core and periphery structure. Densely connected to each other at the core, cooperators successfully isolate defectors at the periphery and earn larger payoffs.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1093\/comnet\/cnz021","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2019,5,14]],"date-time":"2019-05-14T11:36:28Z","timestamp":1557833788000},"source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":7,"title":["Core\u2013periphery segregation in evolving prisoner\u2019s dilemma networks"],"prefix":"10.1093","volume":"8","author":[{"given":"Yunkyu","family":"Sohn","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishiwaseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Jung-Kyoo","family":"Choi","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"School of Economics and Trade, Kyungpook National University, 1370 Sankyuk-dong, Buk-gu, Daegu 702-701, Korea"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"T K","family":"Ahn","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University, Gwanakro 1, Seoul 151-746, Korea"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"286","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2019,6,25]]},"reference":[{"key":"2020021011034187900_B1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1390","DOI":"10.1126\/science.7466396","article-title":"The evolution of cooperation","volume":"211","author":"Axelrod,","year":"1981","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"2020021011034187900_B2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1560","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1133755","article-title":"Five rules for the evolution of cooperation","volume":"314","author":"Nowak,","year":"2006","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"2020021011034187900_B3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"35","DOI":"10.1086\/406755","article-title":"The evolution of reciprocal altruism","volume":"46","author":"Trivers,","year":"1971","journal-title":"Q. 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