{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,16]],"date-time":"2026-04-16T20:09:25Z","timestamp":1776370165436,"version":"3.51.2"},"reference-count":36,"publisher":"Oxford University Press (OUP)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2024,6,28]],"date-time":"2024-06-28T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1719532800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":179,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-nc\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/100000001","name":"National Science Foundation","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["CNS-2012001"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["CNS-2012001"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100000001","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/100000001","name":"National Science Foundation","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["CCF-2144283"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["CCF-2144283"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100000001","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/100000183","name":"Army Research Office","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["W911NF1810208"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["W911NF1810208"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100000183","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2024,1,2]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n               <jats:p>Network games are commonly used to capture the strategic interactions among interconnected agents in simultaneous moves. The agents\u2019 actions in a Nash equilibrium must take into account the mutual dependencies connecting them, which is typically obtained by solving a set of fixed point equations. Stackelberg games, on the other hand, model the sequential moves between agents that are categorized as leaders and followers. The corresponding solution concept, the subgame perfect equilibrium, is typically obtained using backward induction. Both game forms enjoy very wide use in the (cyber)security literature, the network game often as a template to study security investment and externality\u2014also referred to as the interdependent security games\u2014and the Stackelberg game as a formalism to model a variety of attacker\u2013defender scenarios. In this study, we examine a model that combines both types of strategic reasoning: the interdependency as well as sequential moves. Specifically, we consider a scenario with a network of interconnected first movers (firms or defenders, whose security efforts and practices collectively determine the security posture of the eco-system) and one or more second movers, the attacker(s), who determine how much effort to exert on attacking the many potential targets. This gives rise to an equilibrium concept that embodies both types of equilibria mentioned above. We will examine how its existence and uniqueness conditions differ from that for a standard network game. Of particular interest are comparisons between the two game forms in terms of effort exerted by the defender(s) and the attacker(s), respectively, and the free-riding behavior among the defenders.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1093\/cybsec\/tyae009","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,6,28]],"date-time":"2024-06-28T23:14:26Z","timestamp":1719616466000},"source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":6,"title":["Interdependent security games in the Stackelberg style: how first-mover advantage impacts free riding and security (under-)investment"],"prefix":"10.1093","volume":"10","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-8939-6456","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Ziyuan","family":"Huang","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Department, University of Michigan , Beal Avenue, MI 48109 ,","place":["United States"]}]},{"given":"Parinaz","family":"Naghizadeh","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, University of California San Diego , Gilman Drive, CA 92093 ,","place":["United States"]}]},{"given":"Mingyan","family":"Liu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Department, University of Michigan , Beal Avenue, MI 48109 ,","place":["United States"]}]}],"member":"286","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,6,28]]},"reference":[{"key":"2024121909121271700_bib1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"898","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.104.3.898","article-title":"Strategic interaction and networks","volume":"104","author":"Bramoull\u00e9","year":"2014","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"2024121909121271700_bib2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"2374","DOI":"10.1109\/CDC45484.2021.9683518","article-title":"Multi-planner intervention in network games with community structures","volume-title":"2021 60th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control 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