{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,6,17]],"date-time":"2026-06-17T14:16:10Z","timestamp":1781705770883,"version":"3.54.5"},"reference-count":0,"publisher":"Oxford University Press (OUP)","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2026,1,27]],"date-time":"2026-01-27T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1769472000000},"content-version":"am","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n                  <jats:p>I study self-learning pricing algorithms and show that they are collusive in market simulations. To derive a counterfactual that resembles traditional tacit collusion, I conduct market experiments with humans in the same environment. Across different treatments, I vary the market size and the number of firms that use a pricing algorithm. I demonstrate that oligopoly markets can become more collusive if algorithms make pricing decisions instead of humans. In two-firm markets, prices are weakly increasing in the number of algorithms in the market. In three-firm markets, algorithms weaken competition if most firms use an algorithm and human sellers are inexperienced.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1093\/ej\/ueag013","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2026,1,27]],"date-time":"2026-01-27T12:13:50Z","timestamp":1769516030000},"source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Algorithmic and Human Collusion"],"prefix":"10.1093","author":[{"given":"Tobias","family":"Werner","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Southampton ,","place":["UK"]}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"286","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2026,1,27]]},"container-title":["The Economic Journal"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/academic.oup.com\/ej\/advance-article-pdf\/doi\/10.1093\/ej\/ueag013\/66590299\/ueag013.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"am","intended-application":"syndication"},{"URL":"https:\/\/academic.oup.com\/ej\/advance-article-pdf\/doi\/10.1093\/ej\/ueag013\/66590299\/ueag013.pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2026,1,27]],"date-time":"2026-01-27T16:03:28Z","timestamp":1769529808000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/academic.oup.com\/ej\/advance-article\/doi\/10.1093\/ej\/ueag013\/8442263"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2026,1,27]]},"references-count":0,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1093\/ej\/ueag013","relation":{},"ISSN":["0013-0133","1468-0297"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0013-0133","type":"print"},{"value":"1468-0297","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2026,1,27]]},"article-number":"ueag013"}}