{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2024,9,4]],"date-time":"2024-09-04T00:19:45Z","timestamp":1725409185625},"reference-count":32,"publisher":"Oxford University Press (OUP)","issue":"5","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2024,5,13]],"date-time":"2024-05-13T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1715558400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2024,9,3]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n               <jats:p>A common justification for abortion rights is that the death of the fetus does not violate any of the fetus\u2019s time-relative interests. The time-relative interest account (TRIA) of harm and wrongdoing tells us that a necessary condition for harming someone is that his or her time-relative interests are frustrated. Regarding the justification for abortion, this account falls prey to impairment arguments. Impairment arguments entertain cases of prenatal injury, such as the mother using illicit drugs that disable the child. The intuition is that the child who is born with such disabilities is harmed by the mother\u2019s drug use. But it is unclear what time-relative interest is violated in cases of prenatal harm. Typical responses to impairment arguments point out that the abortion case is different because the child does not exist to experience such harms; but in prenatal injury\u2005+\u2005survival cases, the child does live to experience those harms. Thus, the TRIA justification for abortion is not impugned by impairment counter-examples. This article argues that this response to impairment arguments is viciously circular. The response must say that so long as you kill the child, no harm is done. But this assumes that killing itself is morally inconsequential and is not itself a case of harm. The response to impairment arguments, then, assumes the permissibility of abortion.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1093\/jmp\/jhae023","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,5,13]],"date-time":"2024-05-13T14:13:25Z","timestamp":1715609605000},"page":"470-480","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Impairment Arguments, Interests, and Circularity"],"prefix":"10.1093","volume":"49","author":[{"given":"Stephen","family":"Napier","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Villanova University , Villanova, Pennsylvania , USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"286","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,5,13]]},"reference":[{"volume-title":"The Reliability of Sense Perception","year":"1993","author":"Alston","key":"2024090311005283100_CIT0001"},{"volume-title":"Beyond \u201cJustification\u201d: Dimensions of Epistemic 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