{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,10,1]],"date-time":"2026-10-01T16:01:18Z","timestamp":1790870478448,"version":"4.1.0"},"reference-count":42,"publisher":"Oxford University Press (OUP)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2025,3,21]],"date-time":"2025-03-21T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1742515200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/academic.oup.com\/pages\/standard-publication-reuse-rights"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2026,1,13]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n                  <jats:p>We study identification and inference in first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders and selective entry, building on a flexible framework we call the Affiliated Signal with Risk Aversion (AS-RA) model. Assuming exogenous variation in either the number of potential bidders (N) or a continuous instrument (z) shifting opportunity costs of entry, we provide a sharp characterization of the nonparametric restrictions implied by equilibrium bidding. This characterization implies that risk neutrality is nonparametrically testable. In addition, with sufficient variation in both N and z, the AS-RA model primitives are nonparametrically identified (up to a bounded constant) on their equilibrium domains. Finally, we explore new methods for inference in set-identified auction models based on Chen et al. (2018, Econometrica, vol. 86, 1965\u20132018), as well as novel and fast computational strategies using Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints. Simulation studies reveal the good finite-sample performance of our inference methods, which can readily be adapted to other set-identified flexible equilibrium models with parameter-dependent support.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1093\/restud\/rdaf016","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,3,11]],"date-time":"2025-03-11T08:28:31Z","timestamp":1741681711000},"page":"366-403","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["Identification and Inference in First-Price Auctions with Risk-Averse Bidders and Selective Entry"],"prefix":"10.1093","volume":"93","author":[{"given":"Xiaohong","family":"Chen","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Yale University ,","place":["USA"]}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Matthew","family":"Gentry","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Florida State University ,","place":["USA"]}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Tong","family":"Li","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University ,","place":["USA"]}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Jingfeng","family":"Lu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, National University of Singapore ,","place":["Singapore"]}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"286","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,3,21]]},"reference":[{"key":"2026011312491878300_rdaf016-B1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"809","DOI":"10.3982\/QE469","article-title":"Identification of Time and Risk Preferences in Buy-Price Auctions","volume":"8","author":"Ackerberg","year":"2017","journal-title":"Quantitative Economics"},{"key":"2026011312491878300_rdaf016-B2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.3982\/ECTA14030","article-title":"Quantile Selection Models with an Application to Understanding Changes in Wage Inequality","volume":"85","author":"Arellano","year":"2017","journal-title":"Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society"},{"key":"2026011312491878300_rdaf016-B3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"375","DOI":"10.1086\/319558","article-title":"Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions","volume":"109","author":"Athey","year":"2001","journal-title":"Journal of Political Economy"},{"key":"2026011312491878300_rdaf016-B4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"207","DOI":"10.1093\/qje\/qjq001","article-title":"Comparing Open and Sealed bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions","volume":"126","author":"Athey","year":"2011","journal-title":"The Quarterly Journal of Economics"},{"key":"2026011312491878300_rdaf016-B5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"329","DOI":"10.2307\/1593721","article-title":"The Winner\u2019s Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from EBay Auctions","volume":"34","author":"Bajari","year":"2003","journal-title":"The Rand Journal of Economics"},{"key":"2026011312491878300_rdaf016-B6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"703","DOI":"10.1086\/432138","article-title":"Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? 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