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In a model of long-term employment relationship, we characterize the optimal relational contract in the presence of such learning-by-shirking and highlight how the performance measurement system can be managed to sharpen incentives. Two related policies are studied: intermittent replacement of existing measures, and adoption of new ones. In spite of the learning-by-shirking effect, the optimal contract is stationary, and may involve stochastic replacement\/adoption policies that dilute the agent\u2019s information rents from learning how to game the system.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1093\/restud\/rdaa065","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,28]],"date-time":"2020-09-28T19:17:04Z","timestamp":1601320624000},"page":"2014-2041","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":5,"title":["Learning to game the system"],"prefix":"10.1093","volume":"88","author":[{"given":"Jin","family":"Li","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Hong Kong"}]},{"given":"Arijit","family":"Mukherjee","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Michigan State University"}]},{"given":"Luis","family":"Vasconcelos","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Technology Sydney and Nova School of Business and 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