{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,8,2]],"date-time":"2025-08-02T17:49:55Z","timestamp":1754156995443,"version":"3.41.2"},"reference-count":23,"publisher":"Emerald","issue":"5","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2010,6,15]],"date-time":"2010-06-15T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1276560000000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.emerald.com\/insight\/site-policies"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2010,6,15]]},"abstract":"<jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Purpose<\/jats:title><jats:p>The purpose of this paper is to focus on resource allocation and information disclosure policy for defending multiple targets against intentional attacks. The intentional attacks, like terrorism events, probably cause great losses and fatalities. Attackers and defenders usually make decisions based on incomplete information. Adaptive attacking and defending strategies are considered, to study how both sides make more effective decisions according to previous fights.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Design\/methodology\/approach<\/jats:title><jats:p>A stochastic game\u2010theoretic approach is proposed for modeling attacker\u2010defender conflicts. Attackers and defenders are supposed both to be strategic decision makers and partially aware of adversary's information. Adaptive strategies are compared with different inflexible strategies in a fortification\u2010patrol problem, where the fortification affects the security vulnerability of targets and the patrol indicates the defensive signal.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Findings<\/jats:title><jats:p>The result shows that the intentional risk would be elevated by adaptive attack strategies. An inflexible defending strategy probably fails when facing uncertainties of adversary. It is shown that the optimal response of defenders is to adjust defending strategies by learning from previous games and assessing behaviors of adversaries to minimize the expected loss.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Originality\/value<\/jats:title><jats:p>This paper explores how adaptive strategies affect attacker\u2010defender conflicts. The key issue is defense allocation and information disclosure policy for mitigation of intentional threats. Attackers and defenders can adjust their strategies by learning from previous fights, and the strategic adjustment of both sides may be asynchronous.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec>","DOI":"10.1108\/03684921011043279","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2010,7,3]],"date-time":"2010-07-03T07:12:42Z","timestamp":1278141162000},"page":"825-837","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["The impacts of adaptive attacking and defending strategies on mitigation of intentional threats"],"prefix":"10.1108","volume":"39","author":[{"given":"Jing","family":"Zhang","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Shifei","family":"Shen","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Rui","family":"Yang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"140","reference":[{"key":"key2021010619450967700_b1","unstructured":"Al Mannai, W. and Lewis, T. 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