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Also, an effective principal\u2010agent mechanism to achieve Pareto improvement of energy\u2010saving control is constructed.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Findings<\/jats:title><jats:p>The results are convincing: interests of both the principal and agent had consistency under the principal\u2010agent mechanism, and the principal\u2010agent model was a mechanism with rich efficiency that could substantially arouse the enthusiasm of enterprises in energy saving. The comprehensive supervision of local governments over enterprises could effectually eliminate ill effects on energy\u2010saving management caused by information asymmetry under certain circumstances.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Practical implications<\/jats:title><jats:p>It is good for locating the balance of interest of game players by building a government energy saving mechanism based on principal\u2010agent theory. Through solving a game stable strategy, it is beneficial to seize a key point of regulation and control policies.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Originality\/value<\/jats:title><jats:p>The paper succeeds in analyzing decision behaviours of government and enterprises through the basic idea of cooperative game theory so as to make actions of enterprises at all levels agree to government determined solving of energy issues.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec>","DOI":"10.1108\/03684921211257720","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2013,3,25]],"date-time":"2013-03-25T12:36:57Z","timestamp":1364215017000},"page":"874-885","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":3,"title":["A study on government regulation mechanism of promoting enterprises in China in energy conservation"],"prefix":"10.1108","volume":"41","author":[{"given":"Benhai","family":"Guo","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Rongrong","family":"Zhang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Chaoqing","family":"Yuan","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"140","reference":[{"key":"key2022013119583766000_b2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Ciliberti, F., de Haan, J., de Groot, G. and Pierpaolo, P. 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