{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,8,2]],"date-time":"2025-08-02T18:00:49Z","timestamp":1754157649421,"version":"3.41.2"},"reference-count":17,"publisher":"Emerald","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2008,7,18]],"date-time":"2008-07-18T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1216339200000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.emerald.com\/insight\/site-policies"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2008,7,18]]},"abstract":"<jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Purpose<\/jats:title><jats:p>In traditional commerce, an auction is known as a mechanism of determining the value of a commodity that does not have a fixed price. Auctions are exciting and an increasing number of transactions are performed through e\u2010auctions. But most current auctions cannot address all the important security requirements. Usually, auction systems force bidders and sellers to trust the auctioneer and, on the other hand, do not provide anonymity for bidders and sellers. This paper aims to solve these problems by presenting an efficient anonymous secure auction schema (ASAS) without a fully trustworthy auctioneer.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Design\/methodology\/approach<\/jats:title><jats:p>The paper analyzes security properties and the complexity of previous works in auction security and then proposes a new ASAS that is more secure and efficient than previous works. Finally, security properties and the complexity of the new schema and previous works are compared with one another.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Findings<\/jats:title><jats:p>The proposed auction protocol does not force bidders and sellers to trust the auctioneer. In addition, it provides anonymity for both of them. Owing to these newly added features and high degree of security of ASAS, it is suggested that its use in high\u2010value auctions should require tighter security.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Originality\/value<\/jats:title><jats:p>The paper proposes a new schema for electronic auctions that is secure and efficient and, in addition, does not force bidders and sellers to trust the auctioneer.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec>","DOI":"10.1108\/09685220810893225","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2008,8,16]],"date-time":"2008-08-16T07:40:59Z","timestamp":1218872459000},"page":"288-304","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Efficient anonymous secure auction schema (ASAS) without fully trustworthy auctioneer"],"prefix":"10.1108","volume":"16","author":[{"given":"Yoones","family":"Asgharzadeh Sekhavat","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Mohammad","family":"Fathian","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"140","reference":[{"key":"key2022031220262525200_b1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Baudron, O. and Stern, J. (2002), \u201cNon\u2010interactive private auctions\u201d, Proceedings of 5th Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography, pp. 364\u201078.","DOI":"10.1007\/3-540-46088-8_28"},{"key":"key2022031220262525200_b2","unstructured":"Brandt, F. (2002), \u201cA verifiable bidder\u2010resolved auction protocol\u201d, Proceedings of 5th AAMAS Workshop on Deception, Fraud and Trust in Agent Societies, pp. 18\u201025."},{"key":"key2022031220262525200_b4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Cachin, C. (1999), \u201cEfficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party\u201d, Proceedings of 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 120\u20107.","DOI":"10.1145\/319709.319726"},{"key":"key2022031220262525200_b3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chaum, D. 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