{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,11,10]],"date-time":"2025-11-10T07:58:15Z","timestamp":1762761495985,"version":"3.41.2"},"reference-count":28,"publisher":"Emerald","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2019,2,4]],"date-time":"2019-02-04T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1549238400000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.emerald.com\/insight\/site-policies"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["IMDS"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2019,2,4]]},"abstract":"<jats:sec>\n<jats:title content-type=\"abstract-subheading\">Purpose<\/jats:title>\n<jats:p>The online crowdsourcing has been widely applied in the practice. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the all-pay auction contest in crowdsourcing, wherein a seeker posts a task online and the solvers decide whether to participate in the contest and in what extent to spend efforts on their submissions.<\/jats:p>\n<\/jats:sec>\n<jats:sec>\n<jats:title content-type=\"abstract-subheading\">Design\/methodology\/approach<\/jats:title>\n<jats:p>The authors specifically consider two classic contest formats: simultaneous contest and sequential contest, depending on whether the solver can observe the prior solvers\u2019 submissions before making her own effort investment decision or not. They derive both seeker\u2019s and solver\u2019s equilibrium decisions and payoffs under different contest formats, and show that they vary significantly according to the number and the average skill level of solvers.<\/jats:p>\n<\/jats:sec>\n<jats:sec>\n<jats:title content-type=\"abstract-subheading\">Findings<\/jats:title>\n<jats:p>The results show that a solver would always invest more on her submission under simultaneous contest than under sequential contest, as she cannot confirm how other solvers\u2019 submissions would be. This subsequently intensifies the market competition and brings down a solver\u2019s average payoff under simultaneous contest. Although the simultaneous contest gives rise to a higher expected highest quality of all submissions, it also requires the seeker to spend more search cost to identify the best submission. Therefore, when the number of solvers is high or the average skill level is low, the seeker prefers sequential contest to simultaneous contest. The results also show an analogous preference over two formats for the platform.<\/jats:p>\n<\/jats:sec>\n<jats:sec>\n<jats:title content-type=\"abstract-subheading\">Originality\/value<\/jats:title>\n<jats:p>This paper investigates two formats of all-pay auction contest in crowdsourcing and evaluates them from the perspective of solvers, seekers and platforms, respectively. The research offers many interesting insights which do not only explain the incentive mechanisms for solvers under different contest formats, but also make meaningful contributions to the seeker\u2019s or the platform\u2019s adoption strategies between two alternative contest formats in crowdsourcing practice.<\/jats:p>\n<\/jats:sec>","DOI":"10.1108\/imds-09-2017-0433","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,10,19]],"date-time":"2018-10-19T08:48:05Z","timestamp":1539938885000},"page":"35-53","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":11,"title":["Selection of crowdsourcing formats: simultaneous contest vs sequential contest"],"prefix":"10.1108","volume":"119","author":[{"given":"Wanjiang","family":"Deng","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Xu","family":"Guan","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Shihua","family":"Ma","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Shan","family":"Liu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"140","reference":[{"issue":"4","key":"key2020092422274391200_ref001","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"828","DOI":"10.1086\/250031","article-title":"Rent seeking with bounded rationality: an analysis of the all-pay auction","volume":"106","year":"1998","journal-title":"Journal of Political Economy"},{"issue":"2","key":"key2020092422274391200_ref002","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"291","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01211819","article-title":"The all-pay auction with complete information","volume":"8","year":"1996","journal-title":"Economic Theory"},{"issue":"7","key":"key2020092422274391200_ref003","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1157","DOI":"10.1111\/poms.12552","article-title":"Heterogeneous submission behavior and its implications for success in innovation contests with public submissions","volume":"25","year":"2016","journal-title":"Production and Operations Management"},{"issue":"18","key":"key2020092422274391200_ref004","first-page":"609","article-title":"A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments","year":"2015","journal-title":"Experimental Economics"},{"first-page":"119","article-title":"Crowdsourcing and all-pay auctions","year":"2009","key":"key2020092422274391200_ref005"},{"issue":"3","key":"key2020092422274391200_ref006","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"396","DOI":"10.1016\/j.im.2017.09.006","article-title":"Strategic effort allocation in online innovation tournaments","volume":"55","year":"2018","journal-title":"Information & Management"},{"key":"key2020092422274391200_ref007","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"183","DOI":"10.1016\/j.elerap.2016.11.001","article-title":"On the e-commercialization of science: a step toward the future?","volume":"20","year":"2016","journal-title":"Electronic Commerce Research & Applications"},{"issue":"4","key":"key2020092422274391200_ref008","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"583","DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-006-0034-5","article-title":"All-pay auctions with risk-averse players","volume":"34","year":"2006","journal-title":"International Journal of Game Theory"},{"issue":"2","key":"key2020092422274391200_ref009","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"343","DOI":"10.1111\/ijmr.12135","article-title":"Crowdsourcing: a review and suggestions for future research","volume":"20","year":"2018","journal-title":"International Journal of Management Reviews"},{"issue":"1","key":"key2020092422274391200_ref010","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"17","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00003.x","article-title":"Politically contestable rents and transfers","volume":"1","year":"1989","journal-title":"Economics & Politics"},{"issue":"14","key":"key2020092422274391200_ref011","first-page":"1","article-title":"The rise of crowdsourcing","volume":"14","year":"2006","journal-title":"Wired Magazine"},{"key":"key2020092422274391200_ref012","unstructured":"Jian, L., Li, Z. and Liu, T.X. 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