{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,6,25]],"date-time":"2026-06-25T12:08:49Z","timestamp":1782389329199,"version":"3.54.5"},"reference-count":26,"publisher":"Emerald","issue":"12","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,22]],"date-time":"2022-09-22T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1663804800000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.emerald.com\/insight\/site-policies"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["K"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,11,28]]},"abstract":"<jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-subheading\">Purpose<\/jats:title><jats:p>This paper mainly focuses on how to induce all members to represent members' true preferences for supply and demand matching of E-commerce platform in order to generate stable matching schemes with more social welfare of Multi-agent Matching Platform (MMP) and individually stable advantages than traditional methods.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-subheading\">Design\/methodology\/approach<\/jats:title><jats:p>An MMP is designed. Meanwhile, a true preference inducing method, Lower-Bid Ranking (LBR), is proposed to reduce the number of false preferences, which is helpful to solve the problem that too much false preferences leads to low efficiency of platform operation and supply and demand matching. Then, a systematic model of LBR-based Stable Matching (SM-LBR) is proposed.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-subheading\">Findings<\/jats:title><jats:p>To obtain an ideal transaction partner, the adequate preference ordering and modifying according to market environment is needed for everyone, and the platform should give full play to the platforms' information advantages and process historical transaction and cooperation data. Meanwhile, the appropriate supply and demand matching is beneficial to improve the efficiency and quality of platform operation, and the design of matching guidance mechanism is essential.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-subheading\">Originality\/value<\/jats:title><jats:p>The numerical experiments show that, the proposed model (SM-LBR) can induce members to represent the model's true preferences for stable matching and generate effective matchings with more social welfare of MMP and individually stable advantages than traditional methods, which may provide necessary method and model reference for the research of stable matching and E-commerce platform operation.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec>","DOI":"10.1108\/k-05-2022-0684","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,9,21]],"date-time":"2022-09-21T11:25:08Z","timestamp":1663759508000},"page":"6494-6520","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":3,"title":["A systematic model of stable 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