{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,8,2]],"date-time":"2025-08-02T17:25:51Z","timestamp":1754155551879,"version":"3.41.2"},"reference-count":35,"publisher":"Emerald","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2023,1,12]],"date-time":"2023-01-12T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1673481600000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.emerald.com\/insight\/site-policies"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["K"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2024,3,13]]},"abstract":"<jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-subheading\">Purpose<\/jats:title><jats:p>In this study, a dynamic contracting model is developed between a venture capitalist (VC) and an entrepreneur (EN) to explore the influence of asymmetric beliefs regarding output-relevant parameters, agency conflicts and complementarity on the VC's posterior beliefs through the EN's unobservable effort choices to influence the optimal dynamic contract.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-subheading\">Design\/methodology\/approach<\/jats:title><jats:p>The authors construct the contracting model by incorporating the VC's effort, which is ignored in most studies. Using backward induction and a discrete-time approximation approach, the authors solve the continuous-time contract design problem, which evolves into a nonlinear ordinary differential equation (ODE).<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-subheading\">Findings<\/jats:title><jats:p>The optimal equity share that the VC provides to the EN decreases over time. In accordance with the empirical evidence, the EN's optimistic beliefs regarding the project's profitability positively affect its equity share. However, the interactions between the optimal equity share, project risk and both partners' degrees of risk aversion are not monotonic. Moreover, the authors find that the optimal equity share increases with the degree of complementarity, which indicates that the EN is willing to cooperate with the VC. This study\u2019s results also show that the optimal equity shares at each time are interdependent if the VC is risk-averse and independent if the VC is risk-neutral.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-subheading\">Research limitations\/implications<\/jats:title><jats:p>In conclusion, the authors highlight two potential directions for future research. First, the authors only considered a single VC, whereas in practice, a risk project may be carried out by multiple VCs, and it is interesting to discuss how the degree of complementarity affects the number of VCs that ENs contract. Second, the authors may introduce jumps and consider more general multivariate stochastic volatility models for output dynamics and analyze the characteristics of the optimal contracts. Third, further research can deal with other forms of discretionary output functions concerning complementarity, such as Cobb\u2013Douglas and constant elasticity of substitution (See Varian, 1992).<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-subheading\">Social implications<\/jats:title><jats:p>The results of this study have several implications. First, it offers a novel approach to designing dynamic contracts that are specific and easy to operate. To improve the complicated venture investment situation and abate conflict between contractual parties, this study plays a good reference role. Second, the synergy effect proposed in this study provides a theoretical explanation for the executive compensation puzzle in economics, in which managers are often \u201crewarded for luck\u201d (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Wu <jats:italic>et\u00a0al.<\/jats:italic>, 2018). This result indicates a realistic perspective on financing and establishing cooperative relationships, which enhances the efficiency of venture investment. Third, from an empirical standpoint, one can apply this framework to study research and development (R&amp;D) problems.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-subheading\">Originality\/value<\/jats:title><jats:p>First, the authors introduce asymmetric beliefs and Bayesian learning to study the dynamic contract design problem and discuss their effects on equity share. Second, the authors incorporate the VC's effort into the contracting problem, and analyze the synergistic effect of effort complementarity on the optimal dynamic contract.<\/jats:p><\/jats:sec>","DOI":"10.1108\/k-07-2022-0946","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,1,11]],"date-time":"2023-01-11T09:07:38Z","timestamp":1673428058000},"page":"1331-1353","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Optimal contracting with asymmetric belief and complementarity"],"prefix":"10.1108","volume":"53","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-5979-2864","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jia Jia","family":"Chang","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Zhi Jun","family":"Hu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Changxiu","family":"Liu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"140","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,1,12]]},"reference":[{"issue":"2","key":"key2024031301262721500_ref001","first-page":"508","article-title":"Does crowdfunding benefit entrepreneurs and venture capital investors?","volume":"23","year":"2021","journal-title":"Manufacturing and Service Operations Management"},{"issue":"2","key":"key2024031301262721500_ref002","first-page":"901","article-title":"Are CEOs rewarded for luck? 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