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This empirical evidence aims to contrast with the classical view of the largest dispersed firm presented by Berle and Means and challenge the findings by Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, who predict that the shares held by families will decrease if an efficient financial market is put in place. Therefore, family firms represent an important group in the stock market today. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of the family as a controlling owner on firms' performance, valuation and capital structure.<\/jats:italic><\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Design\/methodology\/approach<\/jats:title><jats:p><jats:italic>The paper reviews the current literature related to how family (taking into account specific governance characteristics such as family ownership, family control and family management) affects firms' performance and value.<\/jats:italic><\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Findings<\/jats:title><jats:p><jats:italic>The literature review showed that founder family control and professional (outside) management increase performance, whereas excess control via control enhancing mechanisms (such as dual class shares and pyramidal structures) and descendent management produce both lower valuation and performance. This evidence suggests that families have the incentives and the power to systematically expropriate wealth from minority shareholders.<\/jats:italic><\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Originality\/value<\/jats:title><jats:p><jats:italic>Previous research shows that family firms on average perform better than non\u2010family firms. But this is a non\u2010linear relation due the fact that the relationship between family ownership and performance cannot be identified without distinguishing between control and cash\u2010flow rights. Thus, the literature review as a whole emphasizes that the incentives for the controlling shareholder to engage in expropriation are a function of the institutional framework in which the firm operates. So, for further research, it is important to investigate how family firms perform in different corporate governance systems. A policy implication is the necessity to improve minority shareholders' protection from the risk of expropriation by large shareholders.<\/jats:italic><\/jats:p><\/jats:sec>","DOI":"10.1108\/14720701211214089","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2012,4,8]],"date-time":"2012-04-08T03:21:57Z","timestamp":1333855317000},"page":"199-214","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":15,"title":["Performance, valuation and capital structure: survey of family firms"],"prefix":"10.1108","volume":"12","author":[{"given":"Ana Paula","family":"Matias Gama","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Jorge","family":"Manuel Mendes Galv\u00e3o","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"140","reference":[{"key":"key2022021120383779900_b1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Adams, R., Almeida, H. and Ferreira, D. 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