{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,3]],"date-time":"2026-04-03T21:43:39Z","timestamp":1775252619380,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":47,"publisher":"Emerald","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,2]],"date-time":"2013-08-02T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1375401600000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.emerald.com\/insight\/site-policies"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,2]]},"abstract":"<jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Purpose<\/jats:title><jats:p><jats:italic>Combining ownership and management might lead concentrated shareholders, such as families, to wealth expropriation. The lack of external monitors and disciplinary agents potentially permits them to pursue this path. Thus, monitoring activity is one of the major drawbacks in family controlled firms. The purpose of this paper is to provide an integrated analysis of the governance roles of various block\u2010holders, institutional investors and corporate boards in firm performance in the context of publicly\u2010listed family\u2010controlled firms.<\/jats:italic><\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Design\/methodology\/approach<\/jats:title><jats:p><jats:italic>Using a multi\u2010industry data set of 208 firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange (MSE), this study employs the generalized method of moments (GMM) to address the issue of endogeneity on panel data over the period 200\u20102006.<\/jats:italic><\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Findings<\/jats:title><jats:p><jats:italic>The results show that family firms have better accounting performance than non\u2010family firms. So, active family involvement in management positions seems to reduce managerial opportunism. However, higher accounting performance does not translate into an increase in valuation levels, and thus might not accrue to minority shareholders. Additionally, the results also show an alignment incentive between a coalition of large shareholders (two families) and firm value.<\/jats:italic><\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Research limitations\/implications<\/jats:title><jats:p><jats:italic>This study provides empirical evidence consistent with a block\u2010holder coalition framework that sustains an incentive alignment effect of the coalition of large shareholders (two families) and the firm value. Additionally, the results also support evidence that board dominance is another channel through which families can extract private benefits.<\/jats:italic><\/jats:p><\/jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type=\"abstract-heading\">Originality\/value<\/jats:title><jats:p><jats:italic>This study contributes to understanding that the family firm performance depends on the efficiency of various governance mechanisms. Thus, it offers insights to policy makers to verify board appointment mechanisms used by family firms. Since external board members might be vetted and approved by the family or other dominant block\u2010holders, what is the extent of their independence from the dominant owners?<\/jats:italic><\/jats:p><\/jats:sec>","DOI":"10.1108\/cg-04-2011-0031","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,28]],"date-time":"2013-08-28T10:12:48Z","timestamp":1377684768000},"page":"439-456","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":23,"title":["The governance\u2010performance relations in publicly listed family controlled firms: an empirical analysis"],"prefix":"10.1108","volume":"13","author":[{"given":"Ana Paula","family":"Matias Gama","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Cec\u00edlia","family":"Rodrigues","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"140","reference":[{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Arellano, M. (2003), Panel Data Econometrics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.","DOI":"10.1093\/0199245282.001.0001"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991), \u201cSome tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations\u201d, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58 No. 2, pp. 277\u2010297.","DOI":"10.2307\/2297968"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Anderson, R., Mansi, A. and Reeb, D. (2003), \u201cFounding family ownership and the agency cost of debt\u201d, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 68, pp. 263\u2010285.","DOI":"10.1016\/S0304-405X(03)00067-9"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Anderson, R. and Reeb, D. (2003), \u201cFounding\u2010family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P 500\u201d, Journal of Finance, Vol. 58 No. 3, pp. 1301\u20101328.","DOI":"10.1111\/1540-6261.00567"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Anderson, R. and Reeb, D. (2004), \u201cBoard composition: balancing family influence in S&P 500 firms\u201d, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 49, pp. 209\u2010237.","DOI":"10.2307\/4131472"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Barca, F. and Becht, M. (2001), The Control of Corporate Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford.","DOI":"10.1093\/0199257531.001.0001"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Barontini, R. and Caprio, L. (2006), \u201cThe effect of family control on firm value and performance: evidence from Continental Europe\u201d, European Financial Management, Vol. 12, pp. 689\u2010723.","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-036X.2006.00273.x"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Bennedsen, M. and Wolfenzon, D. (2000), \u201cThe balance of power in closely held corporations\u201d, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58, pp. 113\u2010139.","DOI":"10.1016\/S0304-405X(00)00068-4"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Bennedsen, M., Nielsen, K., P\u00e9rez\u2010Gonz\u00e1lez, F. and Wolfenson, D. (2007), \u201cInside the family firm: the role of families in succession decisions and performance\u201d, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 122, pp. 647\u2010691.","DOI":"10.1162\/qjec.122.2.647"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b10","unstructured":"Berle, A. and Means, G. (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan, New York, NY."},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b11","unstructured":"Bloch, F. and Hege, U. (2001), \u201cMultiple shareholders and control contests\u201d, Working Paper No. 01A16."},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Burkart, M., Gromb, D. and Panunzi, F. (1997), \u201cLarge shareholders, monitoring, and the value of the firm\u201d, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, pp. 693\u2010728.","DOI":"10.1162\/003355397555325"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Burkart, M., Panunzi, F. and Shleifer, A. (2003), \u201cFamily firms\u201d, Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, pp. 2167\u20102202.","DOI":"10.1111\/1540-6261.00601"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Campbell, J. (1996), \u201cUnderstanding risk and return\u201d, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 104, pp. 298\u2010345.","DOI":"10.1086\/262026"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chrisman, J., Sharma, P. and Taggar, S. (2007), \u201cFamily influences on firms: an introduction\u201d, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 60, pp. 1005\u20101011.","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jbusres.2007.02.016"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and Lang, L. (2000), \u201cThe separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations\u201d, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58, pp. 81\u2010112.","DOI":"10.1016\/S0304-405X(00)00067-2"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"DeAngelo, H. and DeAngelo, L. (2000), \u201cControlling stockholders and the disciplinary role of corporate payout policy: a study of the Times Mirror Company\u201d, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 56, pp. 153\u2010207.","DOI":"10.1016\/S0304-405X(00)00039-8"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. (1985), \u201cThe structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences\u201d, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93, pp. 1155\u20101177.","DOI":"10.1086\/261354"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Demsetz, H. and Villalonga, B. (2001), \u201cOwnership structure and corporate performance\u201d, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 7, pp. 209\u2010233.","DOI":"10.1016\/S0929-1199(01)00020-7"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez\u2010de\u2010Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2008), \u201cThe law and economics of self\u2010dealing\u201d, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 88 No. 3, pp. 430\u2010465.","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jfineco.2007.02.007"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Esterin, S. and Prevezer, M. (2011), \u201cThe role of informal institutions in corporate governance: Brazil, Russia, India and China compared\u201d, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Vol. 28 No. 1, pp. 41\u201067.","DOI":"10.1007\/s10490-010-9229-1"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Faccio, M. and Lang, L. (2002), \u201cThe ultimate ownership of Western European corporations\u201d, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 65, pp. 365\u2010395.","DOI":"10.1016\/S0304-405X(02)00146-0"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b23","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Faccio, M., Lang, L. and Young, L. (2001), \u201cDividends and expropriation\u201d, American Economics Review, Vol. 91, pp. 54\u201078.","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.91.1.54"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b24","unstructured":"Favero, C.A., Giglio, S., Honorati, M. and Panunzi, F. (2006), \u201cThe performance of Italian family firms\u201d, Finance working paper no. 127\/2006, ECGI."},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b25","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Gomez\u2010Mejia, L., Larraza\u2010Kintana, M. and Makri, M. (2003), \u201cThe determinants of executive compensation in family\u2010controlled public corporations\u201d, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 46, pp. 226\u2010237.","DOI":"10.5465\/30040616"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b26","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Gomez\u2010Mejia, L., Nunez\u2010Nickel, M. and Guttierrez, I. (2001), \u201cThe role of family ties in agency contracts\u201d, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 44, pp. 81\u201095.","DOI":"10.2307\/3069338"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b27","unstructured":"Gujarati, D.N. and Porter, D.C. (2010), Essentials of Econonometrics, 4th ed., McGraw\u2010Hill International Edition, McGraw\u2010Hill, New York, NY."},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b28","unstructured":"Hermalin, E. and Weisbach, M. (2003), \u201cBoards of directors as an endogenously determined institutions: a survey of the economic literature\u201d, Economic Policy Review, Vol. 9, pp. 7\u201026."},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b29","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Hola, P. and Sanz, L. (2006), \u201cProtected by the family? How closely held family firms protect minority shareholders\u201d, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 59, pp. 356\u2010359.","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jbusres.2005.09.009"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b30","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Jaskiewicz, P. and Klein, S. (2007), \u201cThe impact of goal alignment on board composition and board size in family businesses\u201d, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 60, pp. 1080\u20101089.","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jbusres.2006.12.015"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b31","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"La Porta, R., Lopez\u2010De\u2010Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1999), \u201cCorporate ownership around the world\u201d, Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, pp. 471\u2010517.","DOI":"10.1111\/0022-1082.00115"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b32","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"La Porta, R., Lopez\u2010De\u2010Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (2000), \u201cInvestor protection and corporate governance\u201d, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58, pp. 3\u201027.","DOI":"10.1016\/S0304-405X(00)00065-9"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b33","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Lubatkin, M.H., Durand, R. and Ling, Y. (2007), \u201cThe missing link in family governance theory: a self\u2010other typology of parental altruism\u201d, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 60, pp. 1022\u20101029.","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jbusres.2006.12.019"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b34","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Maug, E. (1998), \u201cLarge shareholders as monitors: is there a trade\u2010off between liquidity and control?\u201d, Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, pp. 65\u201098.","DOI":"10.1111\/0022-1082.35053"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b35","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Maury, B. (2006), \u201cFamily ownership and firm performance: empirical evidence from Western European corporations\u201d, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 12, pp. 321\u2010341.","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jcorpfin.2005.02.002"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b36","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Maury, B. and Pajuste, A. (2005), \u201cMultiple large shareholders and firm value\u201d, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 29, pp. 1813\u20101834.","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jbankfin.2004.07.002"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b37","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Miller, D., Miller, I., Lester, R., Cannella, J. and Albert, A. (2007), \u201cAre family firms really superior performers?\u201d, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 13, pp. 829\u2010858.","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jcorpfin.2007.03.004"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b38","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1988), \u201cManagerial ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis\u201d, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 20, pp. 292\u2010315.","DOI":"10.1016\/0304-405X(88)90048-7"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b39","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Pagano, M. and R\u00f6ell, A. (1998), \u201cThe choice of stock ownership structure: agency costs, monitoring and the decision to go public\u201d, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, pp. 187\u2010226.","DOI":"10.1162\/003355398555568"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b40","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Schulze, W., Lubatkin, M., Dino, R. and Buchholtz, A. (2001), \u201cAgency relationships in family firms: theory and evidence\u201d, Organization Science, Vol. 12, pp. 99\u2010116.","DOI":"10.1287\/orsc.12.2.99.10114"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b41","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1986), \u201cLarge shareholders and corporate control\u201d, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, pp. 461\u2010489.","DOI":"10.1086\/261385"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b42","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1997), \u201cA survey of corporate governance\u201d, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, pp. 737\u2010783.","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b43","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Silva, F. and Majluf, N. (2008), \u201cDoes family ownership shape performance outcomes?\u201d, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 61 No. 6, pp. 609\u2010614.","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jbusres.2007.06.035"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b44","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Smith, B. and Amoako\u2010Adu, B. (1999), \u201cManagement succession and financial performance of family controlled firms\u201d, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 5, pp. 341\u2010368.","DOI":"10.1016\/S0929-1199(99)00010-3"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b45","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Villalonga, B. and Amit, R. (2006), \u201cHow do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?\u201d, Journal Financial Economics, Vol. 80, pp. 385\u2010417.","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jfineco.2004.12.005"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b46","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Winton, A. (1993), \u201cLimitation of liability and the ownership structure of the firm\u201d, Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, pp. 487\u2010512.","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04724.x"},{"key":"key2022020320420662400_b47","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Zwiebel, J. (1995), \u201cBlock investment and partial bene\ufb01ts of corporate control\u201d, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 62, pp. 161\u2010185.","DOI":"10.2307\/2297801"}],"container-title":["Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/www.emeraldinsight.com\/doi\/full-xml\/10.1108\/CG-04-2011-0031","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/www.emerald.com\/insight\/content\/doi\/10.1108\/CG-04-2011-0031\/full\/xml","content-type":"application\/xml","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/www.emerald.com\/insight\/content\/doi\/10.1108\/CG-04-2011-0031\/full\/html","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,7,24]],"date-time":"2025-07-24T23:18:51Z","timestamp":1753399131000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/www.emerald.com\/cg\/article\/13\/4\/439-456\/22906"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,2]]},"references-count":47,"journal-issue":{"issue":"4","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,2]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1108\/CG-04-2011-0031"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1108\/cg-04-2011-0031","relation":{},"ISSN":["1472-0701"],"issn-type":[{"value":"1472-0701","type":"print"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,2]]}}}