{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,27]],"date-time":"2026-03-27T14:09:26Z","timestamp":1774620566014,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":0,"publisher":"Wiley","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2002,12,17]],"date-time":"2002-12-17T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1040083200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":46,"URL":"http:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/termsAndConditions#vor"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Computational Intelligence"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2002,11]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>We envision a future economy where e\u2013markets will play an essential role as exchange hubs for commodities and services. Future e\u2013markets should be designed to be robust to manipulation, flexible, and sufficiently efficient in facilitating exchanges. One of the most important aspects of designing an e\u2013market is market mechanism design. A market mechanism defines the organization, information exchange process, trading procedure, and clearance rules of a market. If we view an e\u2013market as a multi\u2013agent system, the market mechanism also defines the <jats:italic>structure<\/jats:italic> and <jats:italic>rules of the environment<\/jats:italic> in which agents (buyers and sellers) play the market game. We design an e\u2013market mechanism that is <jats:italic>strategy\u2013proof with respect to reservation price, weakly budget\u2013balanced<\/jats:italic>, and <jats:italic>individually rational<\/jats:italic>. Our mechanism also makes sellers unlikely to underreport the supply volume to drive up the market price. In addition, by bounding our market\u2019s efficiency loss, we provide fairly unrestrictive sufficient conditions for the efficiency of our mechanism to converge in a strong sense when (1) the number of agents who <jats:italic>successfully trade<\/jats:italic> is large, or (2) the number of agents, <jats:italic>trading and not<\/jats:italic>, is large. We implement our design using the RETSINA infrastructure, a multi\u2013agent system development toolkit. This enables us to validate our analytically derived bounds by numerically testing our e\u2013market.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-8640.t01-1-00206","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2003,3,11]],"date-time":"2003-03-11T13:08:18Z","timestamp":1047388098000},"page":"596-617","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":114,"title":["Design of a Multi\u2013Unit Double Auction E\u2013Market"],"prefix":"10.1111","volume":"18","author":[{"given":"Pu","family":"Huang","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Alan","family":"Scheller\u2013Wolf","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Katia","family":"Sycara","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"311","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2002,12,17]]},"container-title":["Computational Intelligence"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/api.wiley.com\/onlinelibrary\/tdm\/v1\/articles\/10.1111%2F1467-8640.t01-1-00206","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1111\/1467-8640.t01-1-00206","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2023,11,18]],"date-time":"2023-11-18T12:58:57Z","timestamp":1700312337000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/doi\/10.1111\/1467-8640.t01-1-00206"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2002,11]]},"references-count":0,"journal-issue":{"issue":"4","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2002,11]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1111\/1467-8640.t01-1-00206"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/1467-8640.t01-1-00206","archive":["Portico"],"relation":{},"ISSN":["0824-7935","1467-8640"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0824-7935","type":"print"},{"value":"1467-8640","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2002,11]]}}}