{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,14]],"date-time":"2026-02-14T21:36:42Z","timestamp":1771105002115,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":0,"publisher":"Wiley","issue":"6","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2019,4,3]],"date-time":"2019-04-03T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1554249600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/termsAndConditions#vor"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["onlinelibrary.wiley.com"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["Bioethics"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2019,7]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title><jats:p>In his recent article Perry Hendricks presents what he calls the impairment argument to show that abortion is immoral. To do so, he argues that to give a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral. Because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome, Hendricks concludes that killing the fetus must also be immoral. Here, I claim that killing a fetus does not impair it in the way that giving it fetal alcohol syndrome does. By examining the reason why giving a fetus this condition is wrong, I conclude that the same reasoning, on common pro\u2010choice accounts, does not apply to killing the fetus. Accordingly, Hendricks's argument does not succeed in showing abortion is immoral.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1111\/bioe.12576","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2019,4,4]],"date-time":"2019-04-04T06:05:04Z","timestamp":1554357904000},"page":"723-724","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1002\/crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":13,"title":["The impairment argument for the immorality of abortion: A reply"],"prefix":"10.1111","volume":"33","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-9115-582X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Bruce P.","family":"Blackshaw","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Philosophy University of Birmingham Birmingham UK"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"311","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2019,4,3]]},"container-title":["Bioethics"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1111\/bioe.12576","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/doi\/full-xml\/10.1111\/bioe.12576","content-type":"application\/xml","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1111\/bioe.12576","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2023,8,20]],"date-time":"2023-08-20T08:46:01Z","timestamp":1692521161000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/doi\/10.1111\/bioe.12576"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2019,4,3]]},"references-count":0,"journal-issue":{"issue":"6","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2019,7]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1111\/bioe.12576"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/bioe.12576","archive":["Portico"],"relation":{},"ISSN":["0269-9702","1467-8519"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0269-9702","type":"print"},{"value":"1467-8519","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2019,4,3]]},"assertion":[{"value":"2018-12-18","order":0,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}},{"value":"2019-01-14","order":1,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}},{"value":"2019-04-03","order":2,"name":"published","label":"Published","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}}]}}