{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,11,4]],"date-time":"2025-11-04T17:29:34Z","timestamp":1762277374164,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":24,"publisher":"Wiley","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2016,5,30]],"date-time":"2016-05-30T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1464566400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/termsAndConditions#vor"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Psychol Psychother"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2017,3]]},"abstract":"<jats:sec>\n                    <jats:title>Objectives<\/jats:title>\n                    <jats:p>An Integrative Cognitive Model of mood swings and bipolar disorder proposes that cognitive styles characterized by extreme self\u2010referent appraisals of internal states (e.g., \u2018If I have a bad night's sleep it means that I am about to have a breakdown\u2019) interfere with mood regulation. The aim of this study is to determine whether strong endorsement of such appraisals is predicted by a diminished ability to access disconfirming counterexamples.<\/jats:p>\n                  <\/jats:sec>\n                  <jats:sec>\n                    <jats:title>Design<\/jats:title>\n                    <jats:p>\n                      We examined whether the ability to access two different categories of counterexample (known as Disabling Conditions and Alternative Causes) would predict endorsement of extreme appraisals (measured by the Hypomanic Attitudes and Positive Predictions Inventory;\n                      <jats:styled-content style=\"fixed-case\">HAPPI<\/jats:styled-content>\n                      ) and mania risk (measured by the Hypomanic Personality Scale;\n                      <jats:styled-content style=\"fixed-case\">HPS<\/jats:styled-content>\n                      ).\n                    <\/jats:p>\n                  <\/jats:sec>\n                  <jats:sec>\n                    <jats:title>Method<\/jats:title>\n                    <jats:p>\n                      A non\u2010clinical sample of 150 students completed the\n                      <jats:styled-content style=\"fixed-case\">HAPPI<\/jats:styled-content>\n                      , the\n                      <jats:styled-content style=\"fixed-case\">HPS<\/jats:styled-content>\n                      and a conditional reasoning task that indexed the ability to access Disabling Conditions and Alternative Causes. Current mood was controlled for using the Internal States Scale.\n                    <\/jats:p>\n                  <\/jats:sec>\n                  <jats:sec>\n                    <jats:title>Results<\/jats:title>\n                    <jats:p>\n                      The ability to make use of\n                      <jats:italic>disabling<\/jats:italic>\n                      counterexamples during the reasoning task was inversely related with scores on the\n                      <jats:styled-content style=\"fixed-case\">HAPPI<\/jats:styled-content>\n                      (\n                      <jats:italic>r\u00a0<\/jats:italic>\n                      =\n                      <jats:italic>\u00a0<\/jats:italic>\n                      \u2212.19,\n                      <jats:italic>p\u00a0<\/jats:italic>\n                      &lt;\n                      <jats:italic>\u00a0<\/jats:italic>\n                      .05); participants that were less able to make use of disabling counterexamples endorsed extreme self\u2010referent appraisals to a greater extent. There was no association between the use of alternative cause counterexamples and the\n                      <jats:styled-content style=\"fixed-case\">HAPPI<\/jats:styled-content>\n                      , and no association between either measure of counterexample generation and the\n                      <jats:styled-content style=\"fixed-case\">HPS<\/jats:styled-content>\n                      .\n                    <\/jats:p>\n                  <\/jats:sec>\n                  <jats:sec>\n                    <jats:title>Conclusions<\/jats:title>\n                    <jats:p>A diminished ability to use disconfirming evidence when reasoning about the world may reinforce problematic cognitive styles such as extreme, personalized appraisals of experience, which can interfere with mood regulation.<\/jats:p>\n                  <\/jats:sec>\n                  <jats:sec>\n                    <jats:title>Practitioner points<\/jats:title>\n                    <jats:p>\n                      <jats:list list-type=\"bullet\">\n                        <jats:list-item>\n                          <jats:p>Problematic cognitive styles such as extreme, personalized appraisals of experience may be reinforced by the inability to produce or access evidence that disconfirms these maladaptive beliefs.<\/jats:p>\n                        <\/jats:list-item>\n                        <jats:list-item>\n                          <jats:p>This reasoning bias may be associated with cognitive styles underlying psychopathology.<\/jats:p>\n                        <\/jats:list-item>\n                        <jats:list-item>\n                          <jats:p>There may be clinical utility in exploring the use of disabler generation in psychological interventions, to help disconfirm maladaptive beliefs.<\/jats:p>\n                        <\/jats:list-item>\n                      <\/jats:list>\n                    <\/jats:p>\n                  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