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Contrarily, if transportation costs are low, both firms may prefer the asymmetric information scenario (the informed firm always prefers the informational advantage, while the uninformed firm may or may not prefer to remain uninformed). Information exchange is <jats:italic>ex\u2010ante<\/jats:italic> advantageous for both firms, but <jats:italic>ex\u2010post<\/jats:italic> damaging if transportation costs turn out to be low. If the information is unverifiable, the informed firm does not represent a reliable source of information, since it always prefers to announce that transportation costs are high and there is no contract that induces truthful revelation.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-8586.2012.00472.x","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2012,10,5]],"date-time":"2012-10-05T09:35:11Z","timestamp":1349429711000},"page":"166-185","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION"],"prefix":"10.1111","volume":"67","author":[{"given":"Ant\u00f3nio","family":"Brand\u00e3o","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"CEF.UP and Faculty of Economics, University of Porto  Portugal"}]},{"given":"Joana","family":"Pinho","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Faculty of Economics, University of Porto  Portugal"}]}],"member":"311","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2012,10,5]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_8_2_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0014-2921(95)00042-9"},{"key":"e_1_2_8_3_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2556096"},{"key":"e_1_2_8_4_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S0166-0462(01)00108-9"},{"key":"e_1_2_8_5_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01227495"},{"key":"e_1_2_8_6_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.mathsocsci.2005.05.002"},{"key":"e_1_2_8_7_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/3003640"},{"key":"e_1_2_8_8_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1911955"},{"key":"e_1_2_8_9_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1885531"},{"key":"e_1_2_8_10_1","first-page":"262","author":"Friedman J. 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