{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,21]],"date-time":"2025-02-21T10:30:41Z","timestamp":1740133841751,"version":"3.37.3"},"reference-count":2,"publisher":"BMJ","issue":"2","content-domain":{"domain":["bmj.com"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["J Med Ethics"],"accepted":{"date-parts":[[2022,7,22]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,2]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>In \u2018My body, not my choice: against legalised abortion\u2019, Hendricks offers an intriguing argument that suggests the state can coerce pregnant women into continuing to sustain their fetuses. His argument consists partly in countering Boonin\u2019s defence of legalised abortion, followed by an argument from analogy. I argue in this response article that his argument from analogy fails and, correspondingly, it should still be a woman\u2019s legal choice to have an abortion. My key point concerns the burdensomeness of pregnancy which is morally relevant to the question of whether the state can coerce people to use their bodies to help another person.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1136\/jme-2022-108538","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,7,29]],"date-time":"2022-07-29T17:20:51Z","timestamp":1659115251000},"page":"145-145","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1136\/crossmarkpolicy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["My body, still my choice: an objection to Hendricks on abortion"],"prefix":"10.1136","volume":"49","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-6373-5368","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Kyle","family":"van Oosterum","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"239","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,7,29]]},"reference":[{"key":"2024052219403450000_49.2.145.1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1136\/medethics-2020-107194"},{"key":"2024052219403450000_49.2.145.2","unstructured":"Boonin D . Beyond roe: why abortion should be legal even if the fetus is a person. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2019."}],"container-title":["Journal of Medical Ethics"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/syndication.highwire.org\/content\/doi\/10.1136\/jme-2022-108538","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2024,5,23]],"date-time":"2024-05-23T02:40:42Z","timestamp":1716432042000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/jme.bmj.com\/lookup\/doi\/10.1136\/jme-2022-108538"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2022,7,29]]},"references-count":2,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,1,24]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,2]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1136\/jme-2022-108538"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1136\/jme-2022-108538","relation":{},"ISSN":["0306-6800","1473-4257"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0306-6800"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1473-4257"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2022,7,29]]}}}