{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,21]],"date-time":"2025-02-21T10:30:49Z","timestamp":1740133849874,"version":"3.37.3"},"reference-count":7,"publisher":"BMJ","issue":"5","content-domain":{"domain":["bmj.com"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["J Med Ethics"],"accepted":{"date-parts":[[2023,8,4]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2024,5]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>Kyle van Oosterum and Emma Curran have recently argued that the impairment argument against abortion is weak and accomplishes little. They also claim that impairment fails to explain what makes giving a child fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) immoral, which is an important premise of the argument. Here, I explain that the impairment argument is not as weak as they believe. Further, I argue that impairment offers a superior explanation for what makes giving a child FAS immoral than their proposal based on creative beneficence.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1136\/jme-2023-109416","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,8,16]],"date-time":"2023-08-16T17:21:07Z","timestamp":1692206467000},"page":"342-344","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1136\/crossmarkpolicy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Defending the impairment argument"],"prefix":"10.1136","volume":"50","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-9115-582X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Bruce Philip","family":"Blackshaw","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"239","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,8,16]]},"reference":[{"key":"2024052220123696000_50.5.342.1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/bioe.12533"},{"key":"2024052220123696000_50.5.342.2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1136\/medethics-2020-106904"},{"key":"2024052220123696000_50.5.342.3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1136\/jme-2023-109162"},{"key":"2024052220123696000_50.5.342.4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"968","DOI":"10.1111\/bioe.12644","article-title":"(Regrettably) abortion remains immoral: the impairment argument defended","volume":"33","author":"Hendricks","year":"2019","journal-title":"Bioethics"},{"key":"2024052220123696000_50.5.342.5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/toxsci\/kfr088"},{"key":"2024052220123696000_50.5.342.6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-8519.00251"},{"key":"2024052220123696000_50.5.342.7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Hendricks P . The impairment argument against abortion. In: Blackshaw B , Colgrave N , Rodgers D , eds. Agency, pregnancy, and persons: essays in defense of human life. Routledge, 2022: 162\u201375.","DOI":"10.4324\/9781003181576-12"}],"container-title":["Journal of Medical Ethics"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/syndication.highwire.org\/content\/doi\/10.1136\/jme-2023-109416","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2024,5,23]],"date-time":"2024-05-23T03:20:26Z","timestamp":1716434426000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/jme.bmj.com\/lookup\/doi\/10.1136\/jme-2023-109416"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2023,8,16]]},"references-count":7,"journal-issue":{"issue":"5","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,5,9]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2024,5]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1136\/jme-2023-109416"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1136\/jme-2023-109416","relation":{},"ISSN":["0306-6800","1473-4257"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0306-6800"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1473-4257"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2023,8,16]]}}}