{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2024,6,21]],"date-time":"2024-06-21T10:48:54Z","timestamp":1718966934895},"reference-count":8,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"04","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2000,12]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> The positive prekernel, a solution of cooperative transferable utility games, is introduced. We show that this solution inherits many properties of the prekernel and of the core, which are both sub-solutions. It coincides with its individually rational variant, the positive kernel, when applied to any zero-monotonic game. The positive (pre)kernel is a sub-solution of the reactive (pre)bargaining set. We prove that the positive prekernel on the set of games with players belonging to a universe of at least three possible members can be axiomatized by non-emptiness, anonymity, reasonableness, the weak reduced game property, the converse reduced game property, and a weak version of unanimity for two-person games. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198900000196","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2002,7,27]],"date-time":"2002-07-27T07:04:45Z","timestamp":1027753485000},"page":"287-305","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":6,"title":["THE POSITIVE PREKERNEL OF A COOPERATIVE GAME"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"02","author":[{"given":"PETER","family":"SUDH\u00d6LTER","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld, P.O. Box 100131, D-33501 Bielefeld, Germany"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"BEZALEL","family":"PELEG","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Feldman Building, Givat-Ram, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"p_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1002\/nav.3800120303"},{"key":"p_3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01262514"},{"key":"p_4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(76)90013-2"},{"key":"p_5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.4.4.303"},{"key":"p_8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01769258"},{"key":"p_9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.14.3.448"},{"key":"p_10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1137\/0117107"},{"key":"p_12","first-page":"449","volume":"134","author":"Stearns R. E.","year":"1968","journal-title":"Transactions of the American Mathematical Society"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198900000196","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,7]],"date-time":"2019-08-07T09:22:07Z","timestamp":1565169727000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198900000196"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2000,12]]},"references-count":8,"journal-issue":{"issue":"04","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2000,12]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198900000196"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198900000196","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2000,12]]}}}