{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,21]],"date-time":"2026-04-21T06:37:44Z","timestamp":1776753464648,"version":"3.51.2"},"reference-count":20,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"02n03","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2001,6]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> In models of aspiration-based reinforcement learning, agents adapt by comparing payoffs achieved from actions chosen in the past with an aspiration level. Though such models are well-established in behavioural psychology, only recently have they begun to receive attention in game theory and its applications to economics and politics. This paper provides an informal overview of a range of such theories applied to repeated interaction games. We describe different models of aspiration formation: where (1) aspirations are fixed but required to be consistent with longrun average payoffs; (2) aspirations evolve based on past personal experience or of previous generations of players; and (3) aspirations are based on the experience of peers. Convergence to non-Nash outcomes may result in either of these formulations. Indeed, cooperative behaviour can emerge and survive in the long run, even though it may be a strictly dominated strategy in the stage game, and despite the myopic adaptation of stage game strategies. Differences between reinforcement learning and evolutionary game theory are also discussed. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198901000348","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2002,7,27]],"date-time":"2002-07-27T11:05:45Z","timestamp":1027767945000},"page":"159-174","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":51,"title":["ASPIRATION-BASED REINFORCEMENT LEARNING IN REPEATED INTERACTION GAMES: AN OVERVIEW"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"03","author":[{"given":"JONATHAN","family":"BENDOR","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford, CA 94305-5015, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"DILIP","family":"MOOKHERJEE","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Boston University, 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"DEBRAJ","family":"RAY","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, New York University, 269 Mercer St, NY 10003, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"p_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2171725"},{"key":"p_4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2952357"},{"key":"p_6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(92)90037-I"},{"key":"p_7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1997.2319"},{"key":"p_12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00054"},{"key":"p_13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1882186"},{"key":"p_15","author":"Dixon H. 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