{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2022,3,29]],"date-time":"2022-03-29T13:17:31Z","timestamp":1648559851739},"reference-count":2,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"02","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2002,6]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> We deal with n-player coordination games with vanishing actions, which are repeated games where all non-diagonal entries yield zero-payoffs, and where, moreover, at any stage beyond r<jats:sub>i<\/jats:sub> any player i loses any action that she has not used during the previous r<jats:sub>i<\/jats:sub> stages of play. For these games we examine the set of equilibrium rewards, where we treat the two-player case and the more player case separately. Folk-theorem like results are established. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198902000598","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2002,10,1]],"date-time":"2002-10-01T20:07:50Z","timestamp":1033502870000},"page":"119-126","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":5,"title":["COORDINATION GAMES WITH VANISHING ACTIONS"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"04","author":[{"given":"G.","family":"SCHOENMAKERS","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Mathematics, Maastricht  University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"J.","family":"FLESCH","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Mathematics, Maastricht  University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"F.","family":"THUIJSMAN","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Mathematics, Maastricht  University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"p_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1995.1001"},{"key":"p_5","volume":"1","author":"Sorin S.","year":"1992","journal-title":"R. J. Aumann and S. Hart (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory With Economic Applications"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198902000598","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,6]],"date-time":"2019-08-06T22:02:12Z","timestamp":1565128932000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198902000598"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2002,6]]},"references-count":2,"journal-issue":{"issue":"02","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2002,6]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198902000598"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198902000598","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2002,6]]}}}