{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2022,3,28]],"date-time":"2022-03-28T23:57:16Z","timestamp":1648511836706},"reference-count":14,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"04","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2003,12]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> The paper discusses the relationship between the efficient provision and the Nash equilibrium of stock externalities in a dynamic setting. The following proposition has been proved: under certain conditions, the maximal gains of an agent in the economy by deviating from the Pareto optimal provision of stock externalities is less \u220a, an arbitrary small positive number, when the time discount rate of the agents are sufficiently close to 0. Namely, under the same conditions, a Pareto efficient path is an \u220a-Nash equilibrium where \u220a could be smaller than any predetermined level. The propositions are different from the folk theorems in repeated games because supporting of the \u220a-Nash equilibrium does not require the threat of retaliations from other agents. The policy implications of the above results are also discussed here. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198903001094","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2004,1,30]],"date-time":"2004-01-30T09:17:13Z","timestamp":1075454233000},"page":"347-359","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":5,"title":["A PSEUDO \"FOLK\" THEOREM IN THE STRATEGIC PROVISION OF STOCK EXTERNALITIES"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"05","author":[{"given":"ZILI","family":"YANG","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"P.O. Box 6000, Department of Economics, State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2526030"},{"key":"rf2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0047-2727(87)90082-X"},{"key":"rf3","first-page":"19","volume":"11","author":"Clark E. H.","journal-title":"Public Choice"},{"key":"rf4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1086\/466560"},{"key":"rf5","volume-title":"The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, Club Goods","author":"Cornes R.","year":"1998"},{"key":"rf6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0047-2727(96)01573-3"},{"key":"rf7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1914085"},{"key":"rf8","volume-title":"Mathematical Systems in International Relations Research","author":"Intriligator M. D.","year":"1976"},{"key":"rf9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0014-2921(92)90031-Q"},{"key":"rf10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0047-2727(95)01521-3"},{"key":"rf11","volume-title":"The Economics of Welfare","author":"Pigou A. C.","year":"1946"},{"key":"rf12","first-page":"121","volume":"22","author":"Radner R.","journal-title":"Journal of Economic Theory"},{"key":"rf13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"217","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1939-7445.1998.tb00309.x","volume":"11","author":"Sandal L. K.","journal-title":"Natural Resource Modeling"},{"key":"rf14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/136274"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198903001094","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,7]],"date-time":"2019-08-07T13:23:24Z","timestamp":1565184204000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198903001094"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2003,12]]},"references-count":14,"journal-issue":{"issue":"04","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2003,12]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198903001094"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198903001094","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2003,12]]}}}