{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2022,4,3]],"date-time":"2022-04-03T10:53:21Z","timestamp":1648983201519},"reference-count":9,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"02","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2004,6]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> The grim-trigger strategy introduced by Friedman is often used in economic models, mainly because of its simplicity, to show that collusion can be sustained by means of a subgame perfect equilibrium. In this work we show that, under simple conditions, it is possible to improve on the grim-trigger strategy while retaining subgame perfection and in some cases adding weak renegotiation proofness (in the sense of Farrell and Maskin). The basic idea is that, following a deviation, the cheater, instead of continuing in the Nash equilibrium forever, chooses an autopenalty which signals, in a very strong way, that he\/she would not deviate any more if cooperation were reestablished. We check the nice working of this strategy in the Cournot's oligopoly model. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198904000186","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2004,6,25]],"date-time":"2004-06-25T06:43:52Z","timestamp":1088145832000},"page":"247-264","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["THE FORGIVING TRIGGER STRATEGY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE TRIGGER STRATEGY"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"06","author":[{"given":"M.","family":"ARAMENDIA","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Economia Aplicada IV, Universidad del Pais Vasco, Avda. L. Aguirre 83, Bilbao 48015, Spain"}]},{"given":"L.","family":"RUIZ","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Economia Aplicada IV, Universidad del Pais Vasco, Avda. L. Aguirre 83, Bilbao 48015, Spain"}]},{"given":"F.","family":"VALENCIANO","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Economia Aplicada IV, Universidad del Pais Vasco, Avda. L. Aguirre 83, Bilbao 48015, Spain"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(86)90025-6"},{"key":"rf2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1911077"},{"key":"rf3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1993.1042"},{"key":"rf4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0899-8256(89)90021-3"},{"key":"rf5","first-page":"1","volume":"28","author":"Friedman J. W.","journal-title":"Review of Economic Studies"},{"key":"rf6","first-page":"835","volume":"66","author":"Osborne D. K.","journal-title":"American Economic Review"},{"key":"rf7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(81)90018-1"},{"key":"rf8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(88)90252-9"},{"key":"rf9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(89)90111-7"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198904000186","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,6]],"date-time":"2019-08-06T18:02:50Z","timestamp":1565114570000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198904000186"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2004,6]]},"references-count":9,"journal-issue":{"issue":"02","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2004,6]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198904000186"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198904000186","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2004,6]]}}}