{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,20]],"date-time":"2025-09-20T19:48:37Z","timestamp":1758397717007},"reference-count":5,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"02","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2004,6]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> The paper is a kind of generalization of Rubinstein bargaining model. Rubinstein assumed that preferences of the players were constant in time, and he analyzed models in which preferences of each player were defined either by constant discount rate or by constant bargaining cost. In this paper, a bargaining model is presented, in which preferences of each player are expressed simultaneously by sequence of discount rates and sequence of bargaining costs varying in time. The results presented in the paper concern subgame perfect equilibria. There is a theorem concerning sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Moreover, some theorems presenting forms of subgame perfect equilibria for various cases of the model analyzed have been proved here. A possibility of delay in reaching an agreement is also considered in the paper. If we analyze a class of strategies, that depend on the former history, a delay can appear for some models. The adequate examples are presented. In the paper, some applications of the bargaining model are also described. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198904000198","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2004,6,25]],"date-time":"2004-06-25T06:43:52Z","timestamp":1088145832000},"page":"265-280","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":3,"title":["BARGAINING MODEL WITH SEQUENCES OF DISCOUNT RATES AND BARGAINING COSTS"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"06","author":[{"given":"AGNIESZKA","family":"RUSINOWSKA","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Philosophy, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands"},{"name":"Warsaw School of Economics, Department of Mathematical Economics, Al. Niepodleglosci 162, 02-554 Warsaw, Poland"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","volume-title":"American Political Science Review","author":"Baron D. P.","year":"1989"},{"key":"rf2","first-page":"667","volume":"23","author":"Fishburn P. C.","journal-title":"International Economic Review"},{"key":"rf4","volume-title":"Game Theory for Political Scientists","author":"Morrow J. D.","year":"1994"},{"key":"rf5","volume-title":"Bargaining and Markets","author":"Osborne M. J.","year":"1990"},{"key":"rf6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1912531"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198904000198","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,6]],"date-time":"2019-08-06T18:02:51Z","timestamp":1565114571000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198904000198"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2004,6]]},"references-count":5,"journal-issue":{"issue":"02","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2004,6]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198904000198"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198904000198","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2004,6]]}}}