{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2022,4,6]],"date-time":"2022-04-06T00:54:14Z","timestamp":1649206454646},"reference-count":23,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"04","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2005,12]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium. In particular, the data support the prediction that non-minimal winning coalitions occur when the distance between policy positions of the parties is small relative to the value of forming the government. These conditions hold in games 1, 3, 4 and 5, where subjects played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 91, 52, 82 and 84 percent of the time, respectively. In the remaining game (Game 2) experimental data support the prediction of a minimal winning coalition. Players A and B played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 84 and 86 percent of the time, respectively, and the predicted minimal-winning government formed 92 percent of the time (all strategy choices for player C conform with potential maximization in Game 2). In Games 1, 2, 4 and 5 over 98 percent of the observed Nash equilibrium outcomes were those predicted by potential maximization. Other solution concepts including iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies and strong\/coalition-proof Nash equilibrium are also tested. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198905000612","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2005,12,21]],"date-time":"2005-12-21T10:55:39Z","timestamp":1135162539000},"page":"407-429","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"07","author":[{"given":"ROD","family":"GARRATT","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"University of California, Santa Barbara, Department of Economics, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA"}]},{"given":"JAMES E.","family":"PARCO","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"United States Air Force Academy, Department of Management, Colorado Springs, CO 80840, USA"}]},{"given":"CHENG-ZHONG","family":"QIN","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of California, Santa Barbara, Department of Economics, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA"}]},{"given":"AMNON","family":"RAPOPORT","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Arizona, Department of Management and Policy, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA"},{"name":"Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, China"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","volume-title":"The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd Shapley","author":"Aumann R.","year":"1988"},{"key":"rf2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1957393"},{"key":"rf3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2090255"},{"key":"rf4","volume-title":"Advances in Experimental Social Psychology","author":"Gamson W. 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