{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,16]],"date-time":"2026-03-16T10:20:55Z","timestamp":1773656455183,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":5,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"04","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2005,12]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> In the Edgeworth-Bertrand price game, each player has a capacity output, faces the same market demand, and calls out a price. The high-price caller gets some residual market at her price. The low-price caller gets her capacity at her price or all of the market. We re-work Beckmann's closed form solution to his symmetric version of this game, mostly in mixed strategies, and observe that expected price played by a player declines with the size of her exogenously given capacity. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198905000648","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2005,12,21]],"date-time":"2005-12-21T10:55:39Z","timestamp":1135162539000},"page":"461-472","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["BECKMANN'S EDGEWORTH-BERTRAND DUOPOLY EXAMPLE REVISITED"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"07","author":[{"given":"ALEXEI F.","family":"CHEVIAKOV","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Mathematics, University of British, Columbia, Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z4, Canada"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"JOHN M.","family":"HARTWICK","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","first-page":"387","volume":"76","author":"Allen B.","journal-title":"American Economic Review"},{"key":"rf2","unstructured":"M.\u00a0Beckmann, Methods of Operations Research III, ed. R.\u00a0Henn (Verlag Anton Hain, Meisenheim, 1967)\u00a0pp. 55\u201368."},{"key":"rf3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/3003636"},{"key":"rf4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2525908"},{"key":"rf5","first-page":"382","volume":"76","author":"Maskin E.","journal-title":"American Economic Review"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198905000648","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,6]],"date-time":"2019-08-06T22:03:00Z","timestamp":1565128980000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198905000648"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2005,12]]},"references-count":5,"journal-issue":{"issue":"04","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2005,12]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198905000648"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198905000648","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2005,12]]}}}