{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2023,10,2]],"date-time":"2023-10-02T09:53:07Z","timestamp":1696240387986},"reference-count":8,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"01","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2006,3]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the \"coalition unanimity\" game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2003). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs of the game of coalition formation. We show that if no synergies are generated by the formation of coalitions, a stable coalition structure always exists provided that players are symmetric and either the game exhibits strategic complementarity or, if strategies are substitutes, the best reply functions are contractions. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198906000813","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2006,3,29]],"date-time":"2006-03-29T10:35:09Z","timestamp":1143628509000},"page":"111-126","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":8,"title":["COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"08","author":[{"given":"SERGIO","family":"CURRARINI","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Universit\u00e0 Ca' Foscari di Venezia, Italy"},{"name":"School for Advanced Studied in Venice (SSAV), Venezia, Italy"}]},{"given":"MARCO A.","family":"MARINI","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Istituto di Scienze Economiche, Universit\u00e0 degli Studi di Urbino \"Carlo Bo\", Italy"},{"name":"London School of Economics, UK"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","volume-title":"New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment","author":"Bloch F.","year":"1997"},{"key":"rf2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1086\/261312"},{"key":"rf3","volume-title":"Game Practise and the Environment","author":"Currarini S.","year":"2004"},{"key":"rf4","first-page":"1047","volume":"52","author":"Hart S.","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"rf5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1996.2236"},{"key":"rf6","volume-title":"Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour","author":"von Neumann J.","year":"1944"},{"key":"rf7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1997.0567"},{"key":"rf8","series-title":"Fondazione Enrico Mattei Series in Economics and the Environment","volume-title":"The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions","author":"Yi S.-S.","year":"2003"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198906000813","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,7]],"date-time":"2019-08-07T13:24:49Z","timestamp":1565184289000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198906000813"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2006,3]]},"references-count":8,"journal-issue":{"issue":"01","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2006,3]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198906000813"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198906000813","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2006,3]]}}}