{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,20]],"date-time":"2025-09-20T21:43:54Z","timestamp":1758404634563},"reference-count":15,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"01","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2007,3]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> In this paper, we study the immunity of bankruptcy rules to manipulation via merging or splitting agents' claims. We focus on the TAL-family of bankruptcy rules (Moreno-Ternero &amp; Villar, 2005), a one-parameter family encompassing three classical rules: the Talmud (T) rule, the constrained equal-awards (A) rule and the constrained equal-losses (L) rule. We show that all rules within the TAL-family are partially non-manipulable and identify the domain of problems where each rule is either non-manipulable by merging or non-manipulable by splitting. We also show that they can be ranked in terms of their relative non-manipulability, according to the parameter that generates the family. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198907001308","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2007,5,7]],"date-time":"2007-05-07T07:56:22Z","timestamp":1178524582000},"page":"105-118","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"09","author":[{"given":"JUAN D.","family":"MORENO-TERNERO","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Yale University, Department of Political Science, P.O. Box 208301, New Haven, CT 06520-8301, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(85)90102-4"},{"key":"rf2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-4896(88)90009-1"},{"key":"rf4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s100580050037"},{"key":"rf5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s10058-003-0097-8"},{"key":"rf8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1914185"},{"key":"rf9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1996.0038"},{"key":"rf10","author":"Moreno-Ternero J. D.","journal-title":"Social Choice and Welfare"},{"key":"rf11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01756289"},{"key":"rf12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CCOL0521360552"},{"key":"rf13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S1574-0110(02)80010-8"},{"key":"rf14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.7551\/mitpress\/2954.001.0001","volume-title":"Fair Division and Collective Welfare","author":"Moulin H.","year":"2003"},{"key":"rf15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-4896(82)90029-4"},{"key":"rf16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S0165-4896(02)00070-7"},{"key":"rf17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.12.3.398"},{"key":"rf18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(88)90007-5"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198907001308","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,6]],"date-time":"2019-08-06T18:03:29Z","timestamp":1565114609000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198907001308"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2007,3]]},"references-count":15,"journal-issue":{"issue":"01","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2007,3]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198907001308"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198907001308","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2007,3]]}}}