{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T19:37:26Z","timestamp":1760297846281},"reference-count":10,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"03","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2007,9]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> Symmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games. The games all have two identical bidders bidding in two simultaneous sealed-bid auctions for identical objects. Information is complete and the objects are either complements or substitutes. In both cases a continuum of mixed-strategy equilibria are identified. All these equilibria have a surprising structure: The supports of all the mixtures that generate equilibria are two one-dimensional curves, and they surround a two-dimensional set of pure best responses. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198907001552","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2007,10,4]],"date-time":"2007-10-04T10:45:11Z","timestamp":1191494711000},"page":"483-493","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":6,"title":["TWO-OBJECT TWO-BIDDER SIMULTANEOUS AUCTIONS"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"09","author":[{"given":"BAL\u00c1ZS","family":"SZENTES","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","volume":"1","author":"Ausubel L.","journal-title":"Frontiers of Theoretical Economics"},{"key":"rf2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2297588"},{"key":"rf3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1996.0092"},{"key":"rf4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2938316"},{"key":"rf5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00069"},{"key":"rf6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1996.0093"},{"key":"rf7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2938353"},{"key":"rf8","author":"Szentes B.","journal-title":"Journal of Economic Theory"},{"key":"rf9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(02)00530-4"},{"key":"rf10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(03)00131-3"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198907001552","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,6]],"date-time":"2019-08-06T22:03:49Z","timestamp":1565129029000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198907001552"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2007,9]]},"references-count":10,"journal-issue":{"issue":"03","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2007,9]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198907001552"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198907001552","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2007,9]]}}}