{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2022,4,2]],"date-time":"2022-04-02T19:19:52Z","timestamp":1648927192343},"reference-count":12,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"02","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2009,6]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a procedurally fair matching algorithm for the so-called stable marriage problem. We complement Aldershof et al.'s (1999) analysis in two ways. First, we give an alternative and intuitive description of employment by lotto in terms of a probabilistic serial dictatorship on the set of stable matchings. Second, we show that Aldershof et al.'s (1999) conjectures are correct for small matching markets but not necessarily correct for large matching markets. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198909002248","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2010,1,11]],"date-time":"2010-01-11T04:45:20Z","timestamp":1263185120000},"page":"181-198","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["EMPLOYMENT BY LOTTO REVISITED"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"11","author":[{"given":"BETTINA","family":"KLAUS","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Internef 538, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"FLIP","family":"KLIJN","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Harvard Business School, Baker Library|Bloomberg Center 437, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163, USA"},{"name":"Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC), Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2998580"},{"key":"rf2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1023\/A:1026453915989"},{"key":"rf3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0097-3165(84)90056-6"},{"key":"rf4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2312726"},{"key":"rf5","volume-title":"The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithm","author":"Gusfield D.","year":"1989"},{"key":"rf6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-004-0602-5"},{"key":"rf7","volume-title":"Marriages Stables","author":"Knuth D. E.","year":"1976"},{"key":"rf8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01211824"},{"key":"rf9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00134111"},{"key":"rf10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01934199"},{"key":"rf12","first-page":"991","volume":"6","author":"Roth A. E.","journal-title":"Journal of Political Economy"},{"key":"rf13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CCOL052139015X"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198909002248","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,7]],"date-time":"2019-08-07T09:25:12Z","timestamp":1565169912000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198909002248"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2009,6]]},"references-count":12,"journal-issue":{"issue":"02","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2009,6]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198909002248"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198909002248","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2009,6]]}}}