{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2023,6,25]],"date-time":"2023-06-25T04:58:44Z","timestamp":1687669124287},"reference-count":10,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"03","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2009,9]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> In this note we provide a neccesary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the socially stable core of a general structured TU-game which resembles closely the classical condition of balancedness given by Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) to guarantee the non-emptiness of the classical core. Structured games have been introduced in Herings et al. (2007a) and more recently, in Herings et al. (2007b), studied in the framework of games with transferable utility. In the latter paper, the authors provide suffcient conditions for the non-emptiness of the socially stable core, but up to now, no necessary and sufficient condition is known. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198909002376","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2010,1,11]],"date-time":"2010-01-11T04:45:20Z","timestamp":1263185120000},"page":"383-389","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"11","author":[{"given":"JUAN CARLOS","family":"CESCO","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Instituto de Matem\u00e1tica Aplicada San Luis (UNSL-CONICET), Av. Ej\u00e9rcito de los Andes 950, 5700 San Luis, Argentina"},{"name":"Departamento de Matem\u00e1tica (U.N. San Luis), Chacabuco y Pedernera, 5700 San Luis, Argentina"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1137\/0118049"},{"key":"rf2","first-page":"119","volume":"10","author":"Bondareva O. N.","journal-title":"Problemy Kibernetiki"},{"key":"rf3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/game.2001.0877"},{"key":"rf4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1142\/S0219198904000174"},{"key":"rf5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s11238-006-9007-1"},{"key":"rf6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2006.04.008"},{"key":"rf7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.mathsocsci.2007.05.007"},{"key":"rf8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S0022-0531(03)00261-8"},{"key":"rf9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1909383"},{"key":"rf10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1002\/nav.3800140404"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198909002376","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,6]],"date-time":"2019-08-06T17:58:18Z","timestamp":1565114298000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198909002376"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2009,9]]},"references-count":10,"journal-issue":{"issue":"03","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2009,9]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198909002376"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198909002376","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2009,9]]}}}