{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2022,7,10]],"date-time":"2022-07-10T09:48:49Z","timestamp":1657446529484},"reference-count":12,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"04","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2009,12]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> The PERT (Program Evaluation Review Technique) is a operational research tool used to schedule and coordinate activities in a complex project. We present two values for measuring the importance of each activity. Both values are obtained through an axiomatic characterization using three properties. The first value is characterized with separability, monotonicity, and order preservation. The second value is characterized with separability, equal treatment inside a component, and independence of large durations. We also present an application to the problem of how to share the surplus obtained when a project finishes before the expected completion time. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198909002418","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2010,4,22]],"date-time":"2010-04-22T07:01:18Z","timestamp":1271919678000},"page":"419-436","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["A VALUE FOR <i>PERT<\/i> PROBLEMS"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"11","author":[{"given":"GUSTAVO","family":"BERGANTI\u00d1OS","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Research Group in Economic Analysis, Universidade de Vigo, Spain"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"JUAN","family":"VIDAL-PUGA","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Research Group in Economic Analysis, Universidade de Vigo, Spain"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1023\/A:1016300218643"},{"key":"rf2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S0165-4896(01)00093-2"},{"key":"rf3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S0167-6377(02)00107-4"},{"key":"rf4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2006.11.001"},{"key":"rf5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1023\/A:1016372707256"},{"key":"rf6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.orl.2007.01.003"},{"key":"rf7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.cor.2006.11.003"},{"key":"rf8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.ejor.2007.03.039"},{"key":"rf9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1913954"},{"key":"rf10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2951537"},{"key":"rf11","first-page":"155","volume":"28","author":"Nash J.","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"rf12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"L. S.\u00a0Shapley, Contributions to the Theory of Games II, eds. H. W.\u00a0Kuhn and A. W.\u00a0Tucker (Princeton University Press, 1953)\u00a0pp. 307\u2013317.","DOI":"10.1515\/9781400881970-018"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198909002418","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,7]],"date-time":"2019-08-07T09:25:00Z","timestamp":1565169900000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198909002418"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2009,12]]},"references-count":12,"journal-issue":{"issue":"04","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2009,12]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198909002418"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198909002418","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2009,12]]}}}