{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2022,4,4]],"date-time":"2022-04-04T16:33:54Z","timestamp":1649090034747},"reference-count":9,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"01","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2011,3]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>In a strategic coalitional game, we consider the relations among four cores \u03b1, \u03b2, \u03b3, and the one we call \u03b4 which is obtained by slightly weakening the conjectural cooperative equilibria due to Currarini and Marini. We show that the \u03b1-core and the \u03b3-core are refined by the \u03b4-core; and, moreover that if every player has a dominant strategy, the \u03b2-core is refined by the \u03b3-core, so that the four cores refine themselves in the greek alphabetical order. Two economic games will be considered to show that the refinement of the \u03b1-core can vary from the weakest to the strongest. While the four cores are equal in the pure exchange game, a radical reduction of the \u03b1-core is obtained in the commons game, a simple version of the Cournot game, bringing about a single strategy profile as the \u03b4-core.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198911002836","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2011,12,12]],"date-time":"2011-12-12T12:07:10Z","timestamp":1323691630000},"page":"45-59","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["THE STRATEGIC CORES \u03b1, \u03b2, \u03b3 AND \u03b4"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"13","author":[{"given":"TAKASHI","family":"HARADA","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Graduate School of Economics, Keio University, Minato-ku, Tokyo 108-8345, Japan"}]},{"given":"MIKIO","family":"NAKAYAMA","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Keio University, 2-15-45, Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo 108-8345, Japan"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2012,4,5]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1090\/S0002-9904-1960-10418-1"},{"key":"rf2","volume-title":"Game Practice and the Environment","author":"Currarini S.","year":"2004"},{"key":"rf3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01263279"},{"key":"rf4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.mathsocsci.2005.09.004"},{"key":"rf5","series-title":"Ann. of Math. Study","volume-title":"Advances in Game Theory","volume":"52","author":"Jentzsch G.","year":"1964"},{"key":"rf6","first-page":"479","volume":"32","author":"Masuzawa T.","journal-title":"International Journal of Game Theory"},{"key":"rf7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01047864"},{"key":"rf8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(71)90014-7"},{"key":"rf9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1515\/9781400822539","volume-title":"Supermodularity and Complementarities","author":"Topkis D. M.","year":"1998"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198911002836","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,28]],"date-time":"2020-06-28T17:14:03Z","timestamp":1593364443000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198911002836"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2011,3]]},"references-count":9,"journal-issue":{"issue":"01","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2012,4,5]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2011,3]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198911002836"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198911002836","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2011,3]]}}}