{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,19]],"date-time":"2026-02-19T06:17:49Z","timestamp":1771481869136,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":12,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"01","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2011,3]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo [2002] derive collusive equilibria, where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the hard close auction format, a prisoner's dilemma situation results and collusive equilibria do not longer exist, even for only two bidders. Hence, we introduce a further reason for sniping behavior in Hard Close auctions, i.e. to appear to collude early in the auction and to defect at the very last moment. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s021919891100285x","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2011,12,12]],"date-time":"2011-12-12T07:07:10Z","timestamp":1323673630000},"page":"75-82","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["COLLUSION OR SNIPING IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AUCTIONS \u2014 A PRISONER'S DILEMMA"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"13","author":[{"given":"SASCHA","family":"F\u00dcLLBRUNN","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Luxembourg, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, Luxembourg School of Finance, 4, Rue Albert Borschette, L-1246, Luxembourg"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2012,4,5]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","first-page":"890","volume":"36","author":"Ariely D.","journal-title":"The RAND Journal of Economics"},{"key":"rf2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1593721"},{"key":"rf3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-937X.00211"},{"key":"rf4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jebo.2009.05.023"},{"key":"rf5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.1040.0339"},{"key":"rf8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.6.1.58"},{"key":"rf9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0297.2007.02004.x"},{"key":"rf10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2005.02.010"},{"key":"rf11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S1574-0145(06)01012-9"},{"key":"rf12","first-page":"1261","volume":"6","author":"Rasmusen E. B.","journal-title":"Advances in Theoretical Economics"},{"key":"rf13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1086\/261670"},{"key":"rf14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S021919891100285X","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,6]],"date-time":"2019-08-06T09:18:33Z","timestamp":1565083113000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S021919891100285X"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2011,3]]},"references-count":12,"journal-issue":{"issue":"01","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2012,4,5]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2011,3]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S021919891100285X"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s021919891100285x","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2011,3]]}}}