{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2022,4,3]],"date-time":"2022-04-03T22:27:31Z","timestamp":1649024851114},"reference-count":10,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"04","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2011,12]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> Cellini and Lambertini endogenize through a timing game the moves of the central bank and the private sector in a model of monetary policy la Barro and Gordon. They find a multiplicity of equilibria, as the two Stackelberg outcomes emerge as the solutions of the timing game, with different inflation levels. By using the risk-dominance criterion to select the equilibrium we prove that there is a discontinuity in the inflation bias, depending on the inflation aversion of the private sector. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198911003106","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2012,6,13]],"date-time":"2012-06-13T01:07:14Z","timestamp":1339549634000},"page":"475-480","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["A COMPLEMENTARY NOTE ON THE ISSUE OF TIME INCONSISTENCY REVISITED AS AN EXTENDED GAME"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"13","author":[{"given":"HUBERT","family":"KEMPF","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Banque de France and Paris School of Economics, France"}]},{"given":"GRGOIRE ROTA","family":"GRAZIOSI","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"CERDI-CNRS (Universit\u00e9 d'Auvergne), France"},{"name":"IMF, Fiscal Affairs Department, USA"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2012,6,12]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2005.03.004"},{"key":"rf2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0304-3932(83)90051-X"},{"key":"rf3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1142\/S021919891000257X"},{"key":"rf4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0899-8256(90)90012-J"},{"key":"rf5","volume-title":"A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games","author":"Harsanyi J. C.","year":"1988"},{"key":"rf6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-9779.2010.01473.x"},{"key":"rf7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jpubeco.2010.04.006"},{"key":"rf8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(05)80021-1"},{"key":"rf9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1998.0687"},{"key":"rf10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2004.01.003"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198911003106","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,7]],"date-time":"2019-08-07T12:14:18Z","timestamp":1565180058000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198911003106"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2011,12]]},"references-count":10,"journal-issue":{"issue":"04","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2012,6,12]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2011,12]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198911003106"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198911003106","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2011,12]]}}}