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Following the aspiration literature, not only partitions but also overlapping coalition configurations are allowed. Our procedures interpret this fact in different ways. The first game allows players to participate with a fraction of their time in more than one coalition, while the second assigns probabilities to the formation of potentially overlapping coalitions. We use the strong Nash and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concepts. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198912500041","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2012,6,27]],"date-time":"2012-06-27T16:48:35Z","timestamp":1340815715000},"page":"1250004","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"14","author":[{"given":"CAMELIA","family":"BEJAN","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Rice University, 6100 Main Street, Houston, TX 77005, USA"}]},{"given":"JUAN CAMILO","family":"G\u00d3MEZ","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Business Program, University of Washington Bothell, 18115 Campus Way NE, Bothell, WA 98011, USA"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2012,11,2]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","unstructured":"W.\u00a0Albers, Game Theory and Related Topics (1979)\u00a0pp. 3\u201316."},{"key":"rf2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"R. 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