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If both firms advertise, \"sales potential\" turns into demand, otherwise part of it \"evaporates\" and does not materialize. We determine feasible rewards and equilibria for the limiting average reward criterion. Uniqueness of equilibrium is by no means guaranteed, but Pareto efficiency may serve very well as a refinement criterion for wide ranges of the advertisement costs. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198915400149","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2014,12,9]],"date-time":"2014-12-09T06:30:04Z","timestamp":1418106604000},"page":"1540014","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Long-run Strategic Advertising and Short-run Bertrand Competition"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"17","author":[{"given":"Reinoud","family":"Joosten","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"IEBIS, University of Twente, POB 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2015,4,15]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01193538"},{"key":"rf2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-94-010-0189-2_30"},{"key":"rf3","volume-title":"Repeated Games of Incomplete Information","author":"Aumann R. 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