{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,7,8]],"date-time":"2025-07-08T09:50:14Z","timestamp":1751968214267},"reference-count":9,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"04","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2016,12]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> A generalization of the class of bargaining problems examined by Engwerda and Douven [(2008) On the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution, Int. J. Game Theory 37, 265\u2013279] is studied. The generalized class consists of nonconvex bargaining problems in which the feasible set satisfies the requirement that the set of weak Pareto-optimal solutions can be described by a smooth function. The intrinsic comparative statics of the aforesaid class are derived and shown to be characterized by a symmetric and positive semidefinite matrix, and an upper bound to the rank of the matrix is established. A corollary to this basic result is that a Nash bargaining solution is intrinsically a locally nondecreasing function of its own disagreement point. Other heretofore unknown results are similarly deduced from the basic result. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198916500134","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2016,8,3]],"date-time":"2016-08-03T06:24:54Z","timestamp":1470205494000},"page":"1650013","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Intrinsic Comparative Statics of a Nash Bargaining Solution"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"18","author":[{"given":"Michael R.","family":"Caputo","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, University of Central Florida, P. O. Box 161400, Orlando, FL 32816-1400, USA"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2016,10,26]]},"reference":[{"key":"S0219198916500134BIB001","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-4896(88)90026-1"},{"key":"S0219198916500134BIB002","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-007-0113-2"},{"key":"S0219198916500134BIB003","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00154358"},{"key":"S0219198916500134BIB004","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1907266"},{"key":"S0219198916500134BIB005","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-999X.2006.00232.x"},{"key":"S0219198916500134BIB006","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-999X.2007.00272.x"},{"key":"S0219198916500134BIB007","volume-title":"The Structure of Economics: A Mathematical Analysis","author":"Silberberg E.","year":"1990","edition":"2"},{"key":"S0219198916500134BIB008","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(87)90102-5"},{"key":"S0219198916500134BIB010","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2005.09.003"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198916500134","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,6]],"date-time":"2019-08-06T23:38:12Z","timestamp":1565134692000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198916500134"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2016,10,26]]},"references-count":9,"journal-issue":{"issue":"04","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2016,10,26]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2016,12]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198916500134"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198916500134","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2016,10,26]]}}}