{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2024,8,22]],"date-time":"2024-08-22T19:33:19Z","timestamp":1724355199638},"reference-count":9,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"04","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2016,12]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game) captures a situation in which players can achieve certain payoffs by cooperating. We assume that the players are part of a hierarchy. In the literature, this invokes the assumption that subordinates cannot cooperate without the permission of their superiors. Instead, we assume that superiors can force their subordinates to cooperate. We show how both notions correspond to each other by means of dual TU games. This way, we capture the idea that a superiors\u2019 ability to enforce cooperation can be seen as the ability to neutralize her subordinate\u2019s threat to abstain from cooperation. Moreover, we introduce the coercion value for games with a hierarchy and provide characterizations thereof that reveal the similarity to the permission value. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198916500158","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2016,8,3]],"date-time":"2016-08-03T02:24:54Z","timestamp":1470191094000},"page":"1650015","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["The Need for Permission, the Power to Enforce, and Duality in Cooperative Games with a Hierarchy"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"18","author":[{"given":"Frank","family":"Huettner","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"ESMT European School of Management and Technology, Schlossplatz 1, 10178 Berlin, Germany"}]},{"given":"Harald","family":"Wiese","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Institut f\u00fcr Theoretische Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakult\u00e4t, Universit\u00e4t Leipzig, Grimmaische Str. 12, 04009 Leipzig, Germany"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2016,10,26]]},"reference":[{"key":"S0219198916500158BIB001","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s001860200250"},{"key":"S0219198916500158BIB002","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.disc.2003.10.019"},{"key":"S0219198916500158BIB003","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01766876"},{"key":"S0219198916500158BIB005","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01253782"},{"key":"S0219198916500158BIB006","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.2.3.225"},{"key":"S0219198916500158BIB007","first-page":"307","volume-title":"Contributions to the Theory of Games","volume":"2","author":"Shapley L. S.","year":"1953"},{"key":"S0219198916500158BIB008","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01262510"},{"key":"S0219198916500158BIB009","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1996.0008"},{"key":"S0219198916500158BIB010","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-013-0796-5"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198916500158","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,6]],"date-time":"2019-08-06T19:38:15Z","timestamp":1565120295000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198916500158"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2016,10,26]]},"references-count":9,"journal-issue":{"issue":"04","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2016,10,26]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2016,12]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198916500158"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198916500158","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2016,10,26]]}}}