{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,19]],"date-time":"2025-09-19T07:30:33Z","timestamp":1758267033975},"reference-count":8,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"01","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2018,3]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> We examine maximin and minimax strategies for players in a two-players game with two strategic variables, [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text]. We consider two patterns of game; one is the [Formula: see text]-game in which the strategic variables of players are [Formula: see text]\u2019s, and the other is the [Formula: see text]-game in which the strategic variables of players are [Formula: see text]\u2019s. We call two players Players A and B, and will show that the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the [Formula: see text]-game, and the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the [Formula: see text]-game are all equivalent for each player. However, the maximin strategy for Player A and that for Player B are not necessarily equivalent, and they are not necessarily equivalent to their Nash equilibrium strategies in the [Formula: see text]-game nor the [Formula: see text]-game. But, in a special case, where the objective function of Player B is the opposite of the objective function of Player A, the maximin strategy for Player A and that for Player B are equivalent, and they constitute the Nash equilibrium both in the [Formula: see text]-game and the [Formula: see text]-game. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s021919891750030x","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2017,12,11]],"date-time":"2017-12-11T03:49:48Z","timestamp":1512964188000},"page":"1750030","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Maximin and Minimax Strategies in Two-Players Game with Two Strategic Variables"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"20","author":[{"given":"Atsuhiro","family":"Satoh","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Faculty of Economics, Hokkai-Gakuen University, Toyohira-ku, Sapporo, Hokkaido 062-8605, Japan"}]},{"given":"Yasuhito","family":"Tanaka","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University, Kamigyo-ku, Kyoto 602-8580, Japan"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,3,25]]},"reference":[{"key":"S021919891750030XBIB001","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-8586.2012.00439.x"},{"key":"S021919891750030XBIB002","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.econmod.2012.12.016"},{"key":"S021919891750030XBIB003","first-page":"819","volume":"34","author":"Satoh A.","year":"2014","journal-title":"Econ. Bull."},{"key":"S021919891750030XBIB004","first-page":"1653","volume":"34","author":"Satoh A.","year":"2014","journal-title":"Econ. Bull."},{"key":"S021919891750030XBIB005","first-page":"17","volume":"67","author":"Satoh A.","year":"2016","journal-title":"Econ. Rev."},{"key":"S021919891750030XBIB007","first-page":"1479","volume":"33","author":"Tanaka Y.","year":"2013","journal-title":"Econ. Bull."},{"key":"S021919891750030XBIB008","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.17811\/ebl.2.2.2013.75-83"},{"key":"S021919891750030XBIB009","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2171898"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S021919891750030X","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,6]],"date-time":"2019-08-06T15:32:44Z","timestamp":1565105564000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S021919891750030X"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2018,3]]},"references-count":8,"journal-issue":{"issue":"01","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,3,25]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2018,3]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S021919891750030X"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s021919891750030x","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2018,3]]}}}