{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,7,30]],"date-time":"2025-07-30T13:23:34Z","timestamp":1753881814217,"version":"3.41.2"},"reference-count":20,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd","issue":"04","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,12]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> In this paper, we apply the preplay negotiation procedure proposed by Kalai [1981] [Preplay negotiations and the prisoner\u2019s dilemma, Math. Soc. Sci.\u00a01, 375\u2013379] to the [Formula: see text]-person prisoners\u2019 dilemma with [Formula: see text] and examine whether it promotes cooperation. First, we demonstrate that every perfect equilibrium is a proper equilibrium for any extensive-form game in which players have only two alternatives in each information set. We show that if the preplay is carried out once, the preplay game has a proper equilibrium that realizes cooperation. We also show that if the preplay is executed twice, the game has a proper equilibrium that realizes cooperation regardless of the entering action profile (the starting point of the preplays). Finally, we demonstrate that the preplay game consisting of at least two preplays has a proper equilibrium that realizes cooperation. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198923500135","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,11,9]],"date-time":"2023-11-09T08:51:47Z","timestamp":1699519907000},"source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Resolution of the n-person Prisoners\u2019 Dilemma by Kalai\u2019s Preplay Negotiation Procedure"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"25","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-9669-0856","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Ko","family":"Nishihara","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Faculty of Economics, Fukuoka University, 8-19-1 Nanakuma, Jonan-ku, Fukuoka 814-0180 Japan"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,11,21]]},"reference":[{"key":"S0219198923500135BIB001","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.red.2007.10.004"},{"key":"S0219198923500135BIB002","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.2000.2774"},{"key":"S0219198923500135BIB003","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1911307"},{"key":"S0219198923500135BIB005","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-4896(81)90015-9"},{"key":"S0219198923500135BIB006","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01770226"},{"key":"S0219198923500135BIB007","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(82)90029-1"},{"key":"S0219198923500135BIB008","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01753236"},{"key":"S0219198923500135BIB009","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00003"},{"key":"S0219198923500135BIB010","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s001990050172"},{"key":"S0219198923500135BIB011","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s001990050266"},{"key":"S0219198923500135BIB012","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-5876.2007.00409.x"},{"key":"S0219198923500135BIB013","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01769260"},{"key":"S0219198923500135BIB014","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01047864"},{"volume-title":"Negotiation Analysis","year":"2002","author":"Raiffa H.","key":"S0219198923500135BIB015"},{"key":"S0219198923500135BIB016","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-017-1107-z"},{"key":"S0219198923500135BIB017","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1997.2313"},{"key":"S0219198923500135BIB018","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01766400"},{"volume-title":"Micromotives and Macrobehavior","year":"1978","author":"Schelling T. 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