{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,12,19]],"date-time":"2025-12-19T22:13:33Z","timestamp":1766182413472,"version":"3.41.2"},"reference-count":31,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd","issue":"02","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2025,6]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> A counterterrorism model is developed where a government and a terrorist allocate resources over two periods. Escalation to period\u00a02 occurs if a threshold for the government\u2019s period-1 damage is exceeded. Without escalation four scenarios exist, including deterrence and nonprovocation. With escalation and unitary contest intensity, both players\u2019 fractions of their resources allocated to period\u00a01 equal the sum of their potential period-1 damages divided by the sum of their potential damages in both periods. As the government\u2019s resource superiority increases, the terrorist allocates all its resources to the period-1 attack, and the government deters escalation. Uniform distributions of the contest intensity and the government\u2019s resource superiority over various intervals are considered. Observing that the terrorist\u2019s utility may be U-shaped in the escalation threshold, the government is enabled to determine both its resource allocation and escalation threshold. The government prefers no threshold when it lacks resources and should always escalate, and when it has abundant resources and can deter. For intermediate resource superiority, the government prefers an intermediate threshold. Six game outcomes are shown where escalation is deterred for two disjoint intervals of the government\u2019s resource superiority. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198924500233","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,12,27]],"date-time":"2024-12-27T06:21:01Z","timestamp":1735280461000},"source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["When Escalation is Inevitable: A Role of Thresholds in a Counterterrorism Game"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"27","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-2107-8291","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Gregory","family":"Levitin","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"The Israel Electric Corporation Limited, 1 Nativ Ha\u2019or Street, Haifa 3100001, Israel"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-7319-3876","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Kjell","family":"Hausken","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Faculty of Science and Technology, University of Stavanger4036 Stavanger, Norway"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,11]]},"reference":[{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB001","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1177\/0022002704272863"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB002","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0335.2009.00823.x"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB003","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s10479-010-0833-8"},{"volume-title":"Ghost: Confessions of a Counterterrorism Agent","year":"2008","author":"Burton F.","key":"S0219198924500233BIB004"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB006","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.cor.2006.09.017"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB007","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.4324\/9780203500972.ch7"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB008","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s10957-008-9400-8"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB009","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1177\/0022002709355438"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB010","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.4284\/0038-4038-2012.269"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB011","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s11127-013-0136-0"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB012","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1257\/jel.20181444"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB013","first-page":"45","volume":"120","author":"Glaeser E. L.","year":"2005","journal-title":"Q. J. Econ."},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB014","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2008.02.001"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB015","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1142\/S0219198912500119"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB016","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1142\/S0219198920500139"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB017","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s43546-023-00555-9"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB018","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/deca.1100.0194"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB019","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1057\/jors.2011.79"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB020","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1539-6924.2006.00780.x"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB021","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1023\/A:1024167124083"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB022","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.5711\/morj.15.3.5"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB023","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1539-6924.2011.01593.x"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB024","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2009.03.011"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB025","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1177\/1046878103255492"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB026","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1177\/1046878108314772"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB027","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01213906"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB028","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1201\/9781315396705"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB030","first-page":"97","volume-title":"Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society","author":"Tullock G","year":"1980"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB031","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/LWC.2021.3133891"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB032","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/JIOT.2022.3167052"},{"key":"S0219198924500233BIB033","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TVT.2024.3367935"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198924500233","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,20]],"date-time":"2025-05-20T08:48:07Z","timestamp":1747730887000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/10.1142\/S0219198924500233"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,11]]},"references-count":31,"journal-issue":{"issue":"02","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2025,6]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198924500233"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198924500233","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"0219-1989"},{"type":"electronic","value":"1793-6675"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,11]]},"article-number":"2450023"}}