{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2023,8,31]],"date-time":"2023-08-31T05:13:49Z","timestamp":1693458829357},"reference-count":6,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"01","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. Game Theory Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[1999,3]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> This paper deals in a unified way with the solution concepts for transferable utility games known as the Centre of the Imputation Set value (CIS-value), the Egalitarian Non-Pairwise-Averaged Contribution value (ENPAC-value) and the Egalitarian Non-Separable Contribution value (ENSC-value). These solutions are regarded as the egalitarian division of the surplus of the overall profits after each participant is conceded to get his individual contribution specified in a respective manner. We offer two interesting individual contributions (lower- and upper-k-averaged contribution) based on coalitions of size k(k \u2208 {1,\u2026,n-1}) and introduce a new solution concept called the Egalitarian Non-k-Averaged Contribution value ( EN <jats:sup>k<\/jats:sup> AC -value). CIS-, ENPAC- and ENSC-value are the same as EN <jats:sup>1<\/jats:sup> AC -, EN <jats:sup>n-2<\/jats:sup> AC - and EN <jats:sup>n-1<\/jats:sup> AC -value respectively. It turns out that the lower- and the upper-k-averaged contribution form a lower- and an upper-bound of the Core respectively. The Shapley value is the centre of gravity of n-1 points; EN <jats:sup>1<\/jats:sup> AC -,\u2026, EN <jats:sup>n-1<\/jats:sup> AC -value. EN <jats:sup>k<\/jats:sup> AC -value of the dual game is equal to EN <jats:sup>n-k<\/jats:sup> AC -value of the original game. We provide a sufficient condition on the transferable utility game to guarantee that the EN <jats:sup>k<\/jats:sup> AC -value coincides with the well-known solution called prenucleolus. The condition requires that the largest excesses at the EN <jats:sup>k<\/jats:sup> AC -value are attained at the k-person coalitions, whereas the excesses of k-person coalitions at the EN <jats:sup>k<\/jats:sup> AC -value do not differ. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219198999000050","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2002,8,29]],"date-time":"2002-08-29T23:23:23Z","timestamp":1030663403000},"page":"45-61","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":3,"title":["THE EGALITARIAN NON-k-AVERAGED CONTRIBUTION (<font>EN<\/font><sup>k<\/sup><font>AC<\/font>-) VALUE FOR TU-GAMES"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"01","author":[{"given":"TSUNEYUKI","family":"NAMEKATA","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Information and Management Science, Otaru University of Commerce, 3-5-21 Midori, Otaru, Hokkaido\u2009047-8501, Japan"}]},{"given":"THEO S. H.","family":"DRIESSEN","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente, P.O.\u2009Box\u2009217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"p_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01539733"},{"key":"p_4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01242845"},{"key":"p_6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01254388"},{"key":"p_7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1137\/0117107"},{"key":"p_8","first-page":"307","volume":"28","author":"Shapley L. S.","year":"1953","journal-title":"Annals of Mathematics Study"},{"key":"p_9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01770069"}],"container-title":["International Game Theory Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219198999000050","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,7]],"date-time":"2019-08-07T09:26:29Z","timestamp":1565169989000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219198999000050"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[1999,3]]},"references-count":6,"journal-issue":{"issue":"01","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[1999,3]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219198999000050"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219198999000050","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-1989","1793-6675"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-1989","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6675","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[1999,3]]}}}