{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,22]],"date-time":"2025-05-22T10:43:27Z","timestamp":1747910607959},"reference-count":13,"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","issue":"03","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Int. J. Info. Tech. Dec. Mak."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2006,9]]},"abstract":"<jats:p> We study two kinds of buy-it-now options, temporary and permanent, under a theoretical model of Stackelberg game. In this two-stage game, the bidders, as the followers, use a two-threshold strategy to determine whether to bid or directly buy the item at the posted price, given an auction configuration featured by the seller in the first stage and other common knowledge. Under the uniform distribution assumption for the bidders' valuation, we derive the optimal necessary conditions of the starting price and the buy-it-now price for maximizing the seller's expected revenue. Then, we use two numerical experiments to find some interesting insights, which include that under identical bidders' participation costs, the temporary buy-it-now option can acquire a higher expected revenue for the seller than the permanent option, and a buy-it-now price auction always nontrivially dominates a regular auction in terms of the achieved expected revenue, no matter whether the seller or the bidders are risk-averse. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1142\/s0219622006002131","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2006,10,2]],"date-time":"2006-10-02T11:02:56Z","timestamp":1159786976000},"page":"557-581","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":22,"title":["GAME THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF BUY-IT-NOW PRICE AUCTIONS"],"prefix":"10.1142","volume":"05","author":[{"given":"HAI","family":"YU","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute of Systems Science, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080, China"},{"name":"Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China"},{"name":"Baidu Network, Beijing 100080, China"}]},{"given":"CHUANGYIN","family":"DANG","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Manufacturing Engineering and Engineering Management, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China"}]},{"given":"SHOU-YANG","family":"WANG","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute of Systems Science, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080, China"},{"name":"Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, Tsukuba University, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573, Japan"}]}],"member":"219","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"rf1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S0165-1765(01)00438-4"},{"key":"rf5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-6419.00083"},{"key":"rf6","volume-title":"Auction Theory","author":"Krishna V.","year":"2002"},{"key":"rf7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-6451.00122"},{"key":"rf9","first-page":"26","volume":"5","author":"Mathews T.","journal-title":"Brazilian Electronic Journal of Economics"},{"key":"rf11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s00712-003-0006-1"},{"key":"rf12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s100580050048"},{"key":"rf13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.49.11.1457.20584"},{"key":"rf16","first-page":"381","volume":"71","author":"Riley J. G.","journal-title":"American Economic Review"},{"key":"rf17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-1765(85)90126-0"},{"key":"rf18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x"},{"key":"rf21","unstructured":"H.\u00a0Yu, S. Y.\u00a0Wang and C. Y.\u00a0Dang, Competitive Bidding and Auctions II (Global-Link Publisher, Hong Kong, London, Tokyo, 2005)\u00a0pp. 126\u2013151."},{"key":"rf22","series-title":"Lecture Notes in Computer Science","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"315","DOI":"10.1007\/11600930_31","volume":"3828","author":"Yu H.","year":"2005"}],"container-title":["International Journal of Information Technology &amp; Decision Making"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1142\/S0219622006002131","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2019,8,7]],"date-time":"2019-08-07T14:20:56Z","timestamp":1565187656000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.worldscientific.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1142\/S0219622006002131"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2006,9]]},"references-count":13,"journal-issue":{"issue":"03","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,11,20]]},"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2006,9]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1142\/S0219622006002131"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1142\/s0219622006002131","relation":{},"ISSN":["0219-6220","1793-6845"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0219-6220","type":"print"},{"value":"1793-6845","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2006,9]]}}}