{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,19]],"date-time":"2025-06-19T04:31:56Z","timestamp":1750307516130,"version":"3.41.0"},"reference-count":7,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2009,7,1]],"date-time":"2009-07-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1246406400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["SIGecom Exch."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2009,7]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>In this note we give a survey of bisection auctions. Bisection auctions have been introduced in order to reduce the number of rounds and increase privacy of information in iterative implementations of Vickrey auctions. First, we present the case of discrete valuations. we discuss the strategic properties of this auction and recent results which show that--for 2 bidders--the auction dominates in a particular sense any other auction with respect to the number of bits revealed. For the case of continuous valuations we contrast its properties with the result that no practical query auction can achieve full efficiency in ex-post equilibrium.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/1598780.1598786","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2009,9,1]],"date-time":"2009-09-01T17:52:59Z","timestamp":1251827579000},"page":"1-5","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Bisection auctions"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"8","author":[{"given":"P. Jean-Jacques","family":"Herings","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Maastricht University"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Rudolf","family":"M\u00fcller","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Maastricht University"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Dries","family":"Vermeulen","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Maastricht University"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2009,7]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2007.09.015"},{"volume-title":"Approximate privacy: Foundations and quantification. Dimacs technical report","author":"FEIGENBAUM J.","key":"e_1_2_1_2_1","unstructured":"FEIGENBAUM , J. , JAGGARD , A. D. , AND SCHAPIRA , M. 2009. Approximate privacy: Foundations and quantification. Dimacs technical report , Rutgers University . FEIGENBAUM, J., JAGGARD, A. D., AND SCHAPIRA, M. 2009. Approximate privacy: Foundations and quantification. Dimacs technical report, Rutgers University."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_3_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 16th International Joint Conference on Aritificial Intelligence, T. Dean, Ed. 554-563","author":"FUJISHIMA Y.","year":"1999","unstructured":"FUJISHIMA , Y. , MCADAMS , D. , AND SHOHAM , Y. 1999 . Speeding up ascending-bid auctions . In Proceedings of the 16th International Joint Conference on Aritificial Intelligence, T. Dean, Ed. 554-563 . FUJISHIMA, Y., MCADAMS, D., AND SHOHAM, Y. 1999. Speeding up ascending-bid auctions. In Proceedings of the 16th International Joint Conference on Aritificial Intelligence, T. Dean, Ed. 554-563."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_4_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.orl.2005.07.011"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_5_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"GRIGORIEVA E. HERINGS P. J. J. M\u00dcLLER R. AND VERMEULEN D. 2006b. The family of c-bisection auctions: eficiency and running time. METEOR research memorandum Maastricht Univeristy. available at http:\/\/edocs.ub.unimaas.nl.  GRIGORIEVA E. HERINGS P. J. J. M\u00dcLLER R. AND VERMEULEN D. 2006b. The family of c-bisection auctions: eficiency and running time. METEOR research memorandum Maastricht Univeristy. available at http:\/\/edocs.ub.unimaas.nl.","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.910512"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_6_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-005-0032-z"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_7_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"GRIGORIEVA E. HERINGS P. J. J. M\u00dcLLER R. AND VERMEULEN D. 2009. Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations. Meteor research memorandum Maastricht Univeristy. available at http:\/\/edocs.ub.unimaas.nl.  GRIGORIEVA E. HERINGS P. J. J. M\u00dcLLER R. AND VERMEULEN D. 2009. Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations. Meteor research memorandum Maastricht Univeristy. available at http:\/\/edocs.ub.unimaas.nl.","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.1440144"}],"container-title":["ACM SIGecom Exchanges"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/1598780.1598786","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/1598780.1598786","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,18]],"date-time":"2025-06-18T12:18:09Z","timestamp":1750249089000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/1598780.1598786"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2009,7]]},"references-count":7,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2009,7]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1145\/1598780.1598786"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/1598780.1598786","relation":{},"ISSN":["1551-9031"],"issn-type":[{"type":"electronic","value":"1551-9031"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2009,7]]},"assertion":[{"value":"2009-07-01","order":2,"name":"published","label":"Published","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}}]}}