{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,19]],"date-time":"2025-06-19T04:31:02Z","timestamp":1750307462725,"version":"3.41.0"},"reference-count":47,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2010,10,1]],"date-time":"2010-10-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1285891200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/100000183","name":"Army Research Office","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["W911NF0920072"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["W911NF0920072"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100000183","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/100000181","name":"Air Force Office of Scientific Research","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["FA95500610405"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["FA95500610405"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100000181","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["ACM Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2010,10]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            Researchers have invested much effort in constructing models of the state-dependent (sometimes risk-averse and sometimes risk-prone) nature of human decision making. An important open question is how state-dependent risk behavior can arise and remain prominent in populations. We believe that one part of the answer is the interplay between risk-taking and sequentiality of choices in populations subject to evolutionary population dynamics. To support this hypothesis, we provide simulation and analytical results for evolutionary lottery games, including results on evolutionary stability. We consider a parameterized class of\n            <jats:italic>imitation dynamics<\/jats:italic>\n            in which the parameter 0 \u2264 \u03b1 \u2264 1 yields the\n            <jats:italic>replicator dynamic<\/jats:italic>\n            with \u03b1 = 1 and the\n            <jats:italic>imitate-the-better<\/jats:italic>\n            dynamic with \u03b1 = 0. Our results demonstrate that for every population dynamic in this class except for the replicator dynamic, the interplay between risk-taking and sequentiality of choices allows state-dependent risk behavior to have an evolutionary advantage over expected-value maximization.\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/1858948.1858954","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2012,10,12]],"date-time":"2012-10-12T20:56:02Z","timestamp":1350075362000},"page":"1-21","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["Evolution of state-dependent risk preferences"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"1","author":[{"given":"Patrick","family":"Roos","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Maryland, College Park, MD"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"J. Ryan","family":"Carr","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Maryland, College Park, MD"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Dana S.","family":"Nau","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Maryland, College Park, MD"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2010,10,22]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","first-page":"38","article-title":"Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the","volume":"80","author":"Abel A.","year":"1990","unstructured":"Abel , A. 1990 . Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the Joneses. Amer. Econ. Rev. 80 , 2, 38 -- 42 . Abel, A. 1990. Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the Joneses. Amer. Econ. Rev. 80, 2, 38--42.","journal-title":"Joneses. Amer. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_2_1","volume-title":"The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy","author":"Alexander J. 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