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By jointly setting their bids, colluders may increase their utility by achieving lower prices for their items. The colluders can use monetary transfers to share this utility, but they must reach an agreement regarding their actions. We analyze the agreements that are likely to arise through a cooperative game theoretic approach, transforming the auction setting into a cooperative game. We examine both the setting of a multi-unit auction as well as path procurement auctions.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/1978721.1978726","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2011,5,9]],"date-time":"2011-05-09T12:48:19Z","timestamp":1304945299000},"page":"17-22","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["A cooperative approach to collusion in auctions"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"10","author":[{"given":"Yoram","family":"Bachrach","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Microsoft Research"}]},{"given":"Morteza","family":"Zadimoghaddam","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Mit"}]},{"given":"Peter","family":"Key","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Microsoft Research"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2011,3]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","first-page":"17","article-title":"The lovely but lonely vickrey auction","volume":"1","author":"Ausubel L. 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